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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

RESULTS OF SED CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S SIXTH PLENUM REVIEWED

West German Commentary

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Jun 83 p 11

[Article signed 'Gz,' datelined Berlin, 19 June: "Surprisingly High Investments in the GDR--SED Central Committee Registers a 'Significant Lead' in Plan Fulfillment"]

[Text] Up to the end of May, the GDR has accomplished a considerable economic growth and a "significant lead in plan fulfillment." This is what the SED Politburo has stated at its plenum. In industrial production, a 4.5 percent growth rate was announced. Of the 132 centrally managed industrial combines, 124 had reached their plan goals in commodity production, according to the report from Central Committee secretary Horst Dohlus.

Altogether the judgment on economic development is less severe than last year, even if of course the "unjustified performance disparities" in industry as well as agriculture continue to receive criticism. Surprising is an above-average industrial investment growth by 9.7 percent. About foreign trade, which continues to be a weak spot in the GDR economy, all that was said was that an export surplus was achieved in the exports to the west in the first 5 months. Efforts should have to be increased greatly in fulfilling the export plan as a "fundamental economic task."

The SED is not satisfied with the application of modern technology in production, especially for export. Dohlus demanded of the general directors "new bold ideas for products and procedures through a thorough and astute analysis of the needs of customers and users and of market trends." To that end, one should have to make the cooperation between the sales organs and the R&D departments still much closer. The Politburo criticized that the cutback in working hours because of technical progress did not always lead to higher labor productivity but was in part "used up through shutoff or downtime without any efficiency gain." It is well known that, beginning next year, the general directors have to demonstrate an adequate capacity utilization of highly modern machines, such as industrial robots, in each and every case. Below-capacity time frames become subject to fines.

What was said about agriculture indicated its situation slowly has begun to improve. The livestock feed harvest has had fairly good results, but the "unjustified disparities" in the performances of the large cooperatives

still received censure. The efforts to reduce animal losses were not yet adequate, Dohlus said, and required to be boosted rigorously.

SED Organs's Summary

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 21 Jun 83 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Our Firm Course: To Strengthen Socialism and Insure Peace--On the Results of the SED Central Committee's Sixth Plenum"]

[Text] The sixth SED Central Committee plenum stood under the auspices of the intensive efforts by the working class and all the people toward the continued implementation of the 10th party congress resolutions aimed at strengthening socialism and ensuring peace. The balance-sheet the Central Committee was able to draw up in the middle of the Karl Marx Year included such important events as the friendship visit by our party and government delegation, headed by Erich Honecker, general secretary of our party and chairman of the GDR State Council, to the USSR, the conference of the Political Advisory Commission of the Warsaw Pact states in Prague, the Central Committee secretariat conference with the kreis first secretaries, and the international Karl Marx conference in Berlin, initiated and conducted by our party.

Great things were done in the economy to ensure the requisite performance growth in continuation of the proven course of the main task in its unity of economic and social policy under the conditions of more intensive class struggle. The Politburo report to the sixth plenum, given by Horst Dohlus, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, defined our policy and all working people's deeds of labor as an "expression of the grown fighting strength of the SED and its solid and indissoluble links with the people's masses." That was also richly demonstrated throughout the debate. What the Central Committee members had to say reflected the stability and dynamics of the GDR and the creative and optimistic atmosphere in our republic, following the road pointed out at the 10th SED Congress.

Of crucial weight to an effective contribution by the GDR to the struggle for the safeguarding of peace and the further shaping of the developed socialist society is the ever closer friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Central Committee showed a high appreciation for Erich Honecker's visit and the outcome of his meeting with Yuri Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The Central Committee underscored that Erich Honecker's being awarded the Lenin Medal and the Gold Star of a Hero of the Soviet Union for his distinguished efforts in the national and international workers movement, had made our party and all our people very glad and proud.

The trip of our party and state delegation initiated a new phase in the fraternal relations among our parties, states and peoples. The talks between Erich Honecker and Yuri Andropov documented their complete agreement both with regard to the social domestic policy conceptions of the SED and the CPSU and on all matters of international politics and the class conflict with imperialism. The 185 accords signed thus far in the economic field attest to the variety and long-term nature of our collaboration. The new stipulations for closer correlation of the economic policy and foreign economy relations between both

sides open far-reaching prospects for deepening our fraternal alliance for the benefit of both peoples and of the socialist community of states. The sixth Central Committee plenum also attached great importance to extending our socialist economic integration with the other CEMA member countries as well.

The Politburo report and what the Central Committee members had to say in the debate reflected how seriously concerned our party is about peace. We share this concern with all citizens in our republic and the people all over the world. The desires by the U.S. and NATO missile politicians to turn 1983 into the year for deploying U.S. medium-range missiles, despite all the protests from the international public, have become all too apparent.

The sixth plenum reiterated again: to us there is nothing more important than reliably to ensure peace for the present and future generations. That is the guiding thought of our policy. In that the party and the people invest all their strength. That is also attested to by the Pentacostal meetings of youth in all GDR districts with more than 6 million participants. The meetings' climax came in the international peace demonstration of 250,000 in Potsdam, where Erich Honecker spoke.

The Central Committee espoused its historic obligation to see to it that never again a war would emanate from German soil. Anyone who would favor the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in the FRG and other NATO states fails to serve that task which conforms with the interests of humanity. That warning was voiced by Erich Honecker while speaking on the occasion of awarding outstanding young working people on the eve of the working youth congress of the GDR. What mattered, simply, was that not American but European politics should be made in Europe. No one should forget that the infernal stuff to be stationed in the FRG in 1983 implies the risk of nuclear suicide. There were no two ways about it, what with all the growing realization in the international public.

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states have repeatedly submitted constructive proposals to halt and reverse this perilous development. To this moment, NATO has failed to come up with any constructive answer.

The GDR will always and consistently act in line with its responsibility as a cornerstone of peace on the dividing line between the two social systems in Europe. Of that, everyone can be certain. If, against all reason, U.S. first-strike missiles get stationed on the territories of the FRG and other West European NATO states, the GDR, due to its alliance obligation in the socialist military coalition, will take its own necessary measures to increase the protection of peace and socialism.

The sixth Central Committee plenum underscored that the safeguarding of peace and the peoples' cooperation demanded settling the relations between the two German states step by step, even under the new aspects of the international situation. The deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles planned for the fall of 1983 makes that much harder, of course. The eager advocates of their deployment should not forget that even in 1981 the GDR announced that good neighborly relations could hardly prosper under the shadow of new American nuclear missiles. The situation is also being aggravated by the unbridled

spreading of chauvinism to shift the borders as they evolved in consequence of World War II and postwar developments. Those are demands that completely contradict the set of European treaties including the Basic Treaty between the GDR and the FRG. It certainly is quite a display of gall to talk as if Dresden, Berlin, Magdeburg and Erfurt were among the cities in the FRG. I wonder what they would say in Bonn if leading GDR representatives announced as their goal to have Hamburg, Hannover, Frankfurt, Munich and Bonn incorporated in the GDR. Hopefully, those Sunday sermons in the FRG are not going to remove from FRG policy those realistic elements which, all things considered, did lead to progress in our relations during the last 13 years. Accountability still remains a factor not to be detached from the detente policy, from the recovery of the international situation. The GDR has held on to its policy toward the FRG, marked by continuity, accountability and reliability, even after the government change in Bonn. By it, it has let itself be guided while underhanded plotters in the FRG unleashed their unbridled agitation campaign against our republic, which were bound to encumber these relations seriously.

Our standpoint is that that which was accomplished by the treaty policy has to be treated cautiously and discretion has to be preserved when setbacks arise, for the sake of continuity. What is demanded for the sake of discretion was once again made clear in the Central Committee plenum. The point was made there that it would be of benefit to peace and European security and cooperation not only for the GDR but also for the FRG to advocate that, following the Soviet Union, also the other nuclear powers were to declare their intention to refrain from any nuclear first strike. Like the GDR so also the FRG should work for a nuclear-free Europe. It should support, like the GDR, the signing of a treaty between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on reciprocally renouncing the use of military force and on maintaining peaceful relations. Like the GDR, the FRG also should advocate an agreement at the Geneva negotiations about the number of medium-range missiles available to both sides as well as about the number of warheads for land, air and sea-based missiles. Like the GDR, the FRG also should make efforts at the Geneva disarmament conference toward inducing the United States to share in the elaboration and conclusion, as fast as possible, of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear weapons ban.

An answer to the question what it is, actually, that prevents the FRG from committing itself to such sound goals should ultimately also be expected by all FRG citizens interested in peace, security and good neighborly relations.

The centerpiece of SED activity is a continued economic performance growth for the good of the people, the all-round strengthening of socialism as the decisive peace factor. As a guideline for the implementation of the economic strategy, as issued by the 10th party congress, the Central Committee pointed to the leads supplied by Erich Honecker, during its fifth plenum, and in the conference with the kreis first secretaries. Labor achievements, positions announced and letters written to the party leadership express the working people's agreement, their clear allegiance to SED policy. From the rostrum of the sixth plenum the Central Committee gave thanks to the workers and farmers, the intellectuals and young people, the women and all working people for what they have accomplished in industry and agriculture, science and technology, public education and health, literature and art, and in the armed protection of socialism and peace.

The Central Committee plenum presented an impressive picture of our creative labor achievements. The industrial commodity production growth rate by late May came to 4.5 percent above that of the same period last year. At the same time, the specific energy and material consumption dropped by 8 percent. Labor productivity rose by 5.1 percent above that of the first 5 months last year. Industry came up with products at a value of M 1.8 billion above the plan for public supplies, the economy and exports.

The cooperative farmers and the workers in agriculture, forestry and the food-stuffs industry did a great deal in feeding the population and providing for industry. Animal stocks, as of 31 May 1983, greatly increased in comparison with the same period last year, to 5,773,347 heads of cattle and 12,276,636 pigs. Above and beyond plan targets, 6,700 tons of fatstock, 161,000 tons of milk and 144 million eggs were made available in supplies.

Revealing examples in the Politburo report and in what the speakers said in the debate brought out how our improving economic efficiency made possible ensuring and step by step extending the material and cultural standard of living achieved by the GDR people. The centerpiece of our social policy, the housing construction program, is being implemented consistently. By the end of May, 75,213 apartments had been newly built or modernized, 4,450 more than according to plan. In addition to that, we got 3,812 day nursery spots, 7,788 kindergarten spots, 661 classrooms and 29 school gyms.

As to provisions, the combines in the centrally and bezirk managed industry alone came up with consumer goods at a clip of M 20 billion. In the first 5 months this year citizens bought goods at a value of nearly M 41 billion.

Proceeding from what has been accomplished, the sixth plenum pointed to those matters that must be dealt with on a priority basis. That includes mainly improving the science and technology contribution to increasing economic efficiency and, thus, to national income growth. In this context, the Central Committee pointed to two basic conclusions from the results and experiences at hand:

First, for a fast growth of labor productivity, efficiency and product quality it is necessary to improve their economic lucrativeness perceptibly through a higher creative level of scientific-technical performance. Secondly, it is necessary that new competitive products more definitely determine our economic production and export assortments.

For the sake of maximal productivity and efficiency, another important task lies in making better use of the basic assets and the social labor capacity. Longer operations periods every day for our highly productive machinery and installations through shift labor and multi-shift utilization, e.g. of our more than 23,000 industrial robots, are as much a precept of socialist economic management as is the full capacity utilization of working hours. By managing to resolve these tasks while reducing production consumption, especially by a rational and thrifty use of energy, raw materials and material, a great national income growth becomes possible.

The Central Committee plenum directed the attention of all collectives and their managers at the need greatly to boost the production of high-grade industrial

consumer commodities. That is part and parcel of implementing the main task. Success there also depends on using the science and technology data.

Cooperative farmers and workers can boast of great initiatives pursuant to the party's agrarian policy, issued by the 10th party congress, and the tasks assigned in consequence of it at the 12th Farmers Congress. Now we must achieve still better results in that labor through optimum performance conceptions and permanent performance comparison and further reduce animal losses. The whole village must make the harvest its own business; doing that, one must already look ahead all the way to the work in the fall.

The Politburo report and what was said in the debate by means of many facts pointed out how the continued successful implementation of the 1983 national economic plan is being combined with preparing a 1984 plan that is aimed at high achievements, in conformity with the joint directive from the SED Central Committee Politburo, the Council of Ministers, and the FDGB National Executive Committee. Here one must everywhere carefully analyze the competition initiatives, proposals, recommendations and criticism from the working people and the recommendations contained in trade union position papers for tapping all reserves, and must purposefully draw general rules from the best experiences.

The status report and the debate paid much attention to the steady consolidation of our party's fighting strength and an improvement in the level of political-ideological work, it being the heart of party work. The plenum rated the firm ties between the party and the working class and all working people as a crucial basis for further promoting the optimistic atmosphere resulting from our successful balance-sheet and motivating the working people for high dedication.

Special attention is called to the suggestion to make the work with people more intimate and confident still so that what the party says will always touch the hearts and minds of the working people. Part of expert party management activity always is to see to it that the working people are well, and at the proper time, informed about all matters and connections, their recommendations and suggestions are responsibly handled, and they get actively involved in solving the tasks.

In this sense the party's ideological, political and organizational strength must be further enhanced. This points to the direction for our preparing and conducting the 1983/84 party elections set by the Central Committee.

The course of the sixth Central Committee plenum proved once again that we have strong prerequisites for our further work for the good of the people, for peace and socialism. They have been consistently extended during the months of the Karl Marx Year thus far. They offer us a sound basis for carrying on the 10th party congress policy in all sectors of public life with optimism and creativeness.

5885

CSO: 2300/300

SERVICE PERIODS, RANK-AGE STRUCTURE OF NVA OUTLINED

Bonn TRUPPENPRAXIS in German Vol 27 No 6, Jun 83 pp 403-405

[Article by Lt Col Arnold Lauterbach: "Service Periods, Age Limits, and Availability of Extended Term and Professional Soldiers in the NVA (National People's Army)"]

[Text] This article presents in briefly summarized form some information about service periods, age limits, and the availability of extended-term and professional soldiers in the National People's Army (NVA) of the GDR. In the process of doing this, it becomes clear, among other things, how these politically schooled soldiers are integrated into civilian life as mainstays of the political system following their service period. Subsequent to these remarks, age limits of and pensions drawn by Soviet soldiers are described for comparison purposes.

The NVA has an adequate pool of enlistees and an adequate corps of young commanding officers. Promotion and assignment bottlenecks are unknown there.

The following article describes how on the one hand the NVA is protected against an overaging of the commanding-officer corps through the GDR's national defense legislation, and on the other hand how the officers, warrant officers [Faehnriche], and NCO's who have been sociopolitically trained and tested for their dependability are integrated into civilian life as mainstays of the political system after only a relatively few years of service as former professional soldiers. The manpower follow-up costs subsequent to military service are not borne by the defense budget, but are imposed on the civilian economic sector. Extended-term and professional soldiers are given preference in the granting of openings for university studies and in the awarding of housing, as well as in connection with other privileges.

1. Status, Service Periods, Age Limits

The following serve in the NVA:

- Soldiers in basic military service,
- Soldiers for an extended term,
- Soldiers with a "tour of duty in military professions," designated in what follows as professional soldiers.

Women can serve as both professional and extended-time soldiers.

The basic military service lasts 18 months. Generally speaking those who are liable to military service can be drafted into the basic military service from the age of 18 years up to 31 December of the year in which they have reached 26 years of age.

Soldiers for an extended term (enlisted men, warrant officers, officers) perform active military service for at least 3 years.

The active service period for professional soldiers is at least:

- 10 years for career NCO's,
- 15 years for warrant officers,
- 25 years for career officers.

At the same time, these are the standard service periods for the rank groups mentioned above.¹

In addition the upper limit on the service period is determined by age. Regardless of rank, the age limit is roughly after reaching 65 years of age for men and the age of 60 years for women.

2. Entitlements of Former Extended-term and Professional Soldiers Following Separation From the NVA

a) General Considerations

Following completion of the active service period, the former extended-term and professional soldiers do not receive either gratuities or early pensions. Instead, legal regulations have been issued on the basis of which they are integrated into civilian working life or are admitted to study programs on a priority basis and with increased study allowances.

Housing accommodations at the new place of work are to be allocated "preferentially"² by the local councils or enterprises to those soldiers who have done at least 4 years of military service, and to professional soldiers as early as "within 18 months."³

A career management program during the service period is unknown, except when it helps in the performance of the military function. This is the later task of the civilian enterprises.

These enterprises are obligated in addition to equate certain military occupational designations with certain civilian qualifications, for example:

Military Designation

Motor sergeant (tracked vehicles)
Radio technician sergeant
Ordnance sergeant

Equated in the Civilian Sector With

Vehicle maintenance foreman
Telecommunications foreman
Foreman for machinery and equipment maintenance

Military Designation

Equated in the Civilian Sector With

Technical sergeant (ordnance)	Plant construction foreman
Tank mechanic	Vehicle maintenance foreman
Tank equipment engineer	Mechanical engineer
Engineer-corps engineer	Civil engineer
Engineer-economist (vehicle transport convoy)	Engineer-economist

Every promotion to staff sergeant includes the awarding of a master craftsman's certificate, and every promotion to the rank of lieutenant entails an engineer's title.

b) Entitlements of Former Extended-term Soldiers

Former extended-term soldiers are to be counseled and supported by councils of the kreises or city districts or by employment offices in the selection of suitable jobs. The civilian enterprises must preferentially hire the former soldiers. Here, minimum performance standards for the designated work must be assumed. The enterprises must take the suitable measures to see to it that the former soldier acquires the knowledge necessary for his job within the shortest possible time. The enterprises must hire former extended-term soldiers even when these are temporarily unable to work.⁴

By law, former extended-term soldiers who desire to continue their studies are to be preferentially admitted to study programs by the universities, colleges, and technical schools, so long as they fulfill the necessary prerequisites. After at least 3 years of service time, these former soldiers obtain an "increased basic grant" of 300 marks per month. Students who as extended-term soldiers have served for a longer time obtain in addition:

- after a service period of at least 4 years, 100 marks monthly,
- after a service period of at least 5 years, 200 marks monthly.⁵

c) Entitlements of Former Professional Soldiers

The councils of the bezirks and the "offices for employment and wages" are responsible, among others, for the integration of former professional soldiers into civilian working life.

These have the right to impose conditions on enterprises for the hiring of former professional soldiers "in jobs with a high degree of responsibility." "In accordance with these conditions, the enterprises are obligated to offer contracts of employment to the persons in question."⁶

In the selection of the job and for the purpose of continued career assistance it is assumed that former professional soldiers are reliable supporters of the class struggle and dedicated communists with a sound political education. "As reliable and tested cadres, following their discharge from active military service they are to be integrated into the country's social functions with an appropriate level of responsibility, in accordance with their experience, knowledge, and skills as well as the potentialities of society."⁷

The enterprises must conclude the contractual relationship within 3 months before the date of discharge at the latest.

Former professional soldiers "are to be prepared on a priority basis by the enterprises for the performing of managerial duties, and when the prerequisites exist they are to be assisted, prepared, and detailed for an advanced study program."⁸

The enterprises must conclude supplementary-training and assistance contracts for training and further education. These are regularly monitored for their compliance and suitability, and they are supplemented if necessary.

In the case of occupations which are dependent on performance (piecework/standards) an average wage is to be paid to the former professional soldier for a period of up to 6 months.

The military service period is to be counted towards the soldier's seniority as an employee or his length of time of working in a certain occupation. This results in, among other things, material benefits. "The officers for an extended term, career NCO's, warrant officers, or career officers are to be given employment pay as follows:

"a) for career NCO's or officers for an extended term (with a service period of more than 2 years): at least 750 marks gross,

"b) for warrant officers or career officers up to the rank of first lieutenant: at least 850 marks gross,

"c) for career officers with the rank of captain or major: at least 950 marks gross,

"d) for career officers from the rank of lieutenant colonel up: at least 1,000 marks gross."⁹

If a former professional soldier having the appropriate qualifications decides on a higher education, then universities, colleges, and technical schools are obligated "to guarantee admission to the study program in the same year as his discharge from active military service."¹⁰ The grant amounts to 80 percent of his average monthly net reimbursement in the last year of service prior to admission to the study program, but at most to 1,000 marks and at least to 600 marks monthly.

3. Appraisal

a) Because of the obligation by the civilian economic sector, colleges, and universities to selectively assist or to preferentially admit to study programs former extended-term and professional soldiers, young men and women are given the opportunity to secure for themselves relatively good chances of making a profitable living in the GDR by way of a few years of voluntary service in the NVA. Thereby the NVA is protected against personnel worries both in the officer corps and in the warrant-officer and NCO corps.

b) Because of the fixing of the standard service period for professional soldiers at 10 years for NCO's, 15 years for warrant officers, and 25 years for officers, on the one hand it is possible for the NVA leadership to discharge

a soldier early, regardless of his rank within his occupational-specialty group, whenever it no longer sees any further assignment and promotion possibilities for this individual over the long term. On the other hand, the NVA leadership reserves to itself the power to have professional soldiers serve beyond this standard service period up to the age limit, if in the individual case there is a corresponding need and an assignment opportunity. In this way, there is no possibility of any promotion and assignment bottlenecks, with all their familiar consequences. It is possible to believe reports according to which the NVA has no battalion commander who is older than 35 years, and no regimental commander older than 42 years of age.

c) The shifting of career-management measures to the period of time following military service increases the service strengths of the officer, warrant officer, and NCO corps. Thus this procedure is suited to improving the level of training and operational readiness of the troops.

d) The passing on of a significant portion of personnel costs to the civilian economic sector gives the appearance of lowering the defense expenditures. But in principle it is economically irrelevant whether the manpower follow-up costs for an early transferring of active soldiers into the reserve must be paid directly by the enterprises or indirectly via the national budget.

e) The experienced former soldiers are especially qualified to ensure the preinduction training and the further education of reservists prescribed by laws, in part-time or full-time work in the enterprises, at colleges and universities, and in the Society for Sport and Technology and other "social organizations."¹¹

Because of their particularly intensive "sociological" training in the army, they are also in a position to support the ruling political system in enterprises, colleges, and universities and to militarize the society. As multiplying factors for the NVA in the enterprises, they see to the corresponding recruitment of new personnel. As an influential pressure group, they are in a position to ensure the appreciation required by law for the services of conscripts and longer-term personnel in the NVA by way of later privileges in the enterprises.

f) Because of the short service periods--in relation to the Bundeswehr--of the extended-term and professional soldiers, this produces in the GDR an extensive, well trained, relatively young reserve commanding-officer corps with practical experience, which is made up of former professional soldiers and which by and large maintains its operational readiness in line with the existing advanced training obligations stipulated by law.

Age Limits and Availability of Male Soldiers in the Soviet Army

In contrast to the NVA, in the Soviet armed forces the maximum service age depends on the rank attained. The Soviet Compulsory Military Service Law of 12 October 1967, in the version in effect from 1 January 1982 on (following revisions and amendments) fixes in its § 62 the maximum age for active military service in peacetime as follows:

Staff sergeant	45 years old
Second lieutenant	
Lieutenants	
First lieutenants	40 years old
Captains	
Majors	45 years old
Lieutenant colonels	
Colonels	50 years old
Generals up to lieutenant general	55 years old
Colonel generals	60 years old

For individual soldiers, "if required, active military service can be prolonged by at most 5 years, and only once more by at most 5 years if there is a special necessity, in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the Council of Ministers of the USSR" (Compulsory Military Service Law, § 63).

For marshals, there are no age limits in active military service.

After 25 years of service, the soldiers obtain a 50-percent pension. With increasing seniority, the pension claims increase up to 75 percent.

After the active service period, the soldiers are free to take a civilian job. As a rule they do this, in order to maintain their standard of living.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Order of the National Defense Council of the GDR on the Duration of Military Service in the National People's Army - Service Career Ordinance - NVA -" of 25 March 1982, § 25 and § 26.
2. "Ordinance on Support to Citizens Following Active Military Service - Support Ordinance -" of 25 March 1982, § 12.
3. Loc. cit., § 22.
4. Loc. cit., § 10.
5. Loc. cit., § 11.
6. Loc. cit., § 14.
7. Loc. cit., § 15.
8. Loc. cit., § 16.
9. Loc. cit., § 19.

10. "First Implementing Regulation on the Support Ordinance" of 25 March 1982, § 5.

11. Law on Compulsory Military Service in the GDR - Compulsory Military Service Law - of 25 March 1982, § 37 (2) and § 38 (3) b) and g). Order by the National Defense Council of the GDR on the Affiliation of Those Liable to Military Service With the Reserve of the National People's Army - Reservist Order - of 25 March 1982, § 1. Implementing Regulations on the Reservist Order of 25 March 1982.

12114

CSO: 2300/291

HUNGARY

DISSIDENT SAYS REGIME CRACKDOWN WILL NOT DETER SAMIZDAT

West Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 10 Jun 83 p 8

[Interview with Miklos Haraszti, dissident writer by the editors of GEGENSTIMMEN (Vienna) in Budapest; date not given]

[Text] In Hungary, the country often celebrated as the model of a real-socialist country, the opposition critical of the system has been put under increasing pressure since December of last year. (See in this paper, 13 Apr 83). In the following interview, conducted by the Vienna newspaper GEGENSTIMMEN, which was placed at our disposal, the Hungarian author, Miklos Haraszti, reports from Budapest on the most recent repression measures and on the policy followed with respect to Laszlo Rajk and Ottilia Solt. In this country, Haraszti became known, above all, through his book "Piecewage", published by Rotbuch, in which he depicts the working conditions in the Hungarian state industry.

Question: In early April, searches in the homes of a whole list of Hungarian dissidents were reported by international press agencies. What exactly happened during the last few weeks?

Answer: On the night from 29 to 30 March, all six apartments where Samizdat literature is often sold were searched. These included the new apartment of Laszlo Rajk where, just as before, every Tuesday there is a Boutique held selling Samizdat literature; at the home of Ottilia Solt, the founder of the Committee to Help the Poor (SZETA); the homes of Gabor Demszky and Jenő Nagy, activists of the independent publishing house AB; the homes of Ferenc Koszeg and myself, both editors of the magazine BESZELO. The police worked very thoroughly and confiscated many books, manuscripts and publications. In my home, the action began at 1:30 a.m. and lasted until 4:00 a.m. when I was brought to the Central Police of Budapest in Tolnai and was interrogated until 8 in the morning.

Identification controls are constantly taking place and, during the night of 7 April, the car of Laszlo Rajk and Gabor Demszky was stopped by six policemen; at the end, they were threatened with cocked pistols when they refused to also show them manuscripts. Both lodged legal complaints. The following night, there was another search at Demszky's home where, after the action of the previous week, they found nothing, of course.

In contrast to last December, when house searches were followed only by warnings, the six of us now have legal proceedings against us for breaking the press law.

Question: Does it mean, that there will be a process?

Answer: It is possible if either we fail to confess or we appeal a conviction. The possible penalties are a fine of up to 180,000 forints or, if this cannot be collected, a half a year in jail.

Question: Could the Boutique, to sell Samizdat literature in the apartment of Laszlo Rajk, be continued?

Answer: Every Tuesday, there are so many policemen in front of the house, that even shopping has become dangerous. Not only visitors but even passers-by are forced to submit to identification checks and are threatened so that, in practice, it is hardly possible any more to conduct the Boutique as before.

The situation is quite clear. The police makes it clear to us that, from now on, we will no longer have a peaceful minute. They were commissioned by the political leadership of the country to finish off Samizdat without disturbing the liberal image of Hungary. Therefore, there should be no open political indictment. Instead, they limit themselves to an administrative process which can, of course, also be very effective if carried out consistently.

Question: How far did the authorities succeed, since December, in limiting the spread of Samizdat?

Answer: They were certainly outraged that we did not retreat. Number 5/6 of BESZELO did get published and a new paper named AB TAJEKOZTATO, meaning information, has appeared. To be sure, on 29 March, they confiscated everything that was to be sold that night at the terminals of the distribution network. And that was very much. About 200 issues of BESZELO and a few hundred issues of AB TAJEKOZTATO.

Question: How did the political discussion about the stand of the opposition in the last few months turn out?

Answer: For the first time in the history of Hungarian opposition, a concrete reform program was proposed in the leading article of BESZELO No 5/6. This makes it impossible for the Party leadership to impute catastrophic wishes to the democratic opposition. We argue that true economic reforms are impossible as long as there is no real worker class representation. There is no one with whom the government can work out necessary price increases or reductions in the standard of living, derived from the world economic situation. The style of rule heretofore made it impossible to test the limits to which the working class can be stressed.

Question: Does it mean that you want independent trade unions?

Answer: We indicate that we consider a gradual process possible. The leadership must not be able to say that what we demand would mean a kind of

Polish revolution or some other development untenable for Moscow. According to our proposals, the first phase would be a democratization at the lowest step of trade unions where the people should freely elect their representatives. This could be tested over a 3 year period after which the experiences could be discussed again. Naturally, we also want a reform of the press so that the status of newspapers such as ours also becomes clear, and all reform groups and discussion groups can distribute their information.

Questions such as the leading role of the Party or the position of Moscow in our political life, we do not want to touch. This is a democratic reform in a very clearly defined terrain which would be good business to everyone: to the bureaucracy because it would prevent the economic crisis from sliding into a national, political catastrophe, and also to those who hope for a democratic future of Hungary.

Question: Are there indications that such proposals also meet with response from among the workers class?

Answer: I have not yet heard about an organized movement. But that such proposals are popular, and that the absence of representation by their own is the main reason for the general lack of enthusiasm for work, seems to be clear to everyone.

Question: What are the prospects of Samizdat's sphere of influence outside of the intellectuals?

Answer: BESZELO is produced in 100 copies and each copy is read by 20 to 30 people. What we write about is no extremist position but rather it expresses what all the reform intellectuals and a large part of youth think. With the existence of Samizdat, a whole region of critical culture began which the government can no longer erase so easily today, because they would then press people into Samizdat where they often write under pseudonym anyhow. Samizdat has brought a whole list of topics into Hungarian culture for the first time. Among them, it was the first to handle the situation of Hungarian minorities in Romania and in Czechoslovakia. Here, the policy of the government is lethal. They do not mention it and they nourish thereby precisely the chauvinistic and even irredentic sentiments. On TV or in the press, a xenophobic treatment of the neighboring nations is permitted and, in the cabarets of Budapest, one can crack jokes about the "stupid Romanians". The dangerous dynamics of this can only be countered by a public and sometimes painful discussion. Of course, this should also extend to the situation of the gypsies, Romanians and Slovaks in Hungary whose public education is not at all as well as the Hungarian government repeatedly maintains.

Question: In the foreign countries to the West, the picture of a politically liberal and economically successful Hungary dominates. Why then does the democratic opposition proceed from the actuality of a severe economic crisis?

Answer: Hungary is surely still credit worthy and that rescues our balance of payments each year. Nevertheless, last November, the government had

to announce for the first time that the standard of living will be lowered. With the current methods of economic management, an insolvency à la Poland or Romania can perhaps be avoided, but a lethal stagnation for many, many years cannot. The government know that, without fundamental economic reforms, there is a danger of such stagnation. Reform, meaning decentralization of the internal management of large enterprises, a truly market-oriented and not administrative management of industry, and an acceleration of product turnover. They need reforms: what is lacking is the spirit of political daring to start them and also to draw the political consequences. Because such a path is impossible without the workers and all others involved having the possibility to freely articulate their interests and to negotiate about them.

Question: Are there already inferences to be drawn from the increased repression?

Answer: In December, we have thought that it was only an obeisance to Andropov and Moscow. This obviously was an error, more is involved here. The Boutique has now actually become physically impossible and it depends on Laszlo Rajk how it will continue. A new distribution system must be found. In any case, we don't want to discontinue Samizdat. We consider the existence of free speech a national acquisition which satisfies the needs of many thousands of us who simply can no longer accept this culture of lies. The wider the space is for freedom of thought, the more daring will be the spirit of the official literature. And, in this manner, we can help to keep Hungary on a course of reforms and to counter the deep-seated instinct of the government to solve crises with Stalinist methods.

2473

CSO: 2300/281

VATICAN SAYS BULANYISTS VIOLATE CHURCH AUTHORITY

Budapest UJ EMBER in Hungarian 22 May 83 p 1

[Unsigned article: "In Strong Unity with the Local Church and in Community with the Bishops"]

[Text] Archbishop Luigi Poggi, Apostolic Nuncio in charge of extraordinary Church affairs, in company of J. John Bukovsky an officer of the Secretariat of the Church Public Affairs Council, visited Hungary between 4 and 12 May. He met with Laszlo Cardinal Lekai, several bishops and Secretary of State Imre Miklos, chairman of the State Office of Church Affairs, in order to conduct routine discussions on timely problems. He also visited the new wing under construction of the boarding school of Svetits High School in Debrecen, the Patrona Hungariae Girl School and the John XXIII Nursing Home, both in Budapest. Accompanied by Laszlo Cardinal Lekai Poggi called on Bishop Tibor Bartha, the pastor-chairman of the Synod of Hungary's Reformed Church, who is also chairman of the Ecumenic Council of Hungarian Churches.

During his visit Archbishop Poggi presented a letter that Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State, addressed to Laszlo Cardinal Lekai. In this letter the Vatican secretary of state informs the chairman of our Bench of Bishops about the standpoint of the Holy See concerning the grassroot communities directed by Father Gyorgy Bulanyi of the Piarist Order.

Vatican City
30 April 1983

To His Eminence the Most Reverend Laszlo Cardinal Lekai, Chairman of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops.

Most Reverent Eminence:

The Hungarian Bench of Bishops has repeatedly informed the Holy See in the past about the religious and pastoral difficulties caused by the "basic communities" notably by those which are directed by the Reverend Father Gyorgy Bulanyi, member of the Piarist Order.

You most Reverend Eminence and their Excellencies the archbishops and bishops of your country at their "ad limina Apostolorum" visit in last October have given us information; also your Eminence when with several zealous bishops

visited lately the Roman Curia has enlightened us on the question: finally your letter addressed to the Pope on the 12th of the current month contained further information. All these provided us with the possibility to examine once and again this issue of great importance.

Aside from the doctrinary problem, the information furnished to us shows that these "communities" in contrast with other legally functioning communities are ignoring the authority of the diocesan bishops and are denying obedience to them, breaking thereby the unity of the local Churches which is obligatory for everybody. Yet this unity is one of the basic traits of life of the local Churches in Hungary just as in other countries.

However the principles which should govern the activities of the "basic communities" in the Church as a whole are well known.

The Holy See put them often on record and published them particularly in its apostolic exhortation "Evangelii Nunciandi" of 8 December 1975 and in its "Catechesi tradendae" of 16 October 1979.

And insofar as your Church is concerned, Pope Paul VI of blessed memory explained the same principles to you, Hungarian bishops, in April 1977, when you were for "ad limina apostolorum" visit in Rome. Pope John Paul II discussed them in specific details in his letter on catechesis that he had addressed to you on 6 April 1980. Thereafter the Vicar of Christ, after due consideration of the reports received in the meantime, reverted to the subject in his address to you when you were again present in Rome for an "ad limina apostolorum" visit on 7 October 1982, emphasizing that: "in order to call these communities really ecclesiastic, they have to form a solid unity with the local Churches of which they are members and through them with the universal Church; always in community with their bishops and under their guidance."

After a careful scrutiny of all the new reports that were submitted on this issue to the Holy Father, I have been authorized by his Holiness to inform your Eminence that the Holy See, sharing the concern of your Bench of Bishops approves of and corroborates with his authority all that you have decided on these "basic communities" for he is concerned about the unity of the Hungarian Church.

Besides the Holy See exhorts the Hungarian bishops to support and promote with all means those "basic communities" which abide by the rules set forth by the aforementioned papal documents and which are flourishing and bear fruit in your homeland.

Moreover, we enjoin the bishops to take permanent care of the religious instruction of the children in schools, churches and other places fit for such purpose. They should see to it that as many faithful as possible participate in religious, liturgical and parish activities. You should remember the words that St Paul had addressed to his disciple Timothy: "Preach the word, be instant in season, out of season, reprove, rebuke exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine." (2 Tim, 2,4) The bishops must accomplish their pastoral duties with full devotion.

In addition the Holy Father wishes that your Eminence and you, bishops, persuade Reverend Father Bulanyi with fatherly exhortation as soon as possible that he and his followers obey the advises and commands that the bishops as their legal and responsible pastors impart to them in the exercise of their rights and duties, watching over the unity and discipline of the Church.

I wish it from the bottom of my heart that this extraordinary Holy Year bring peace to your hearts and souls in the spirit of brotherly love and filial obedience and that it lead us all to conversion.

Finally, I take pleasure in expressing my respect to your Eminence.

12312

CSO: 2500/311

NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, ETHNICITY EXAMINED

Munich SUEDEST EUROPA in German No 2, 1983 pp 92-106

[Article by Gerhard Seewann and Kathrin Sitzler: "Hungarian National Self-consciousness Today. On the Historical-Political Self-interpretation of a Socialist Society"]

[Text] God bless the Hungarian

...
Torn by ill fate for so long,
Give him some years filled with joy,
These people had already atoned
For their past and future.

Ferenc Kolcsey: National Anthem

...
The battle fought by our ancestors
Should remembrance dissolve into peace,
To dispose of our common concerns
Is our task--it will not be small.

Attila Jozsef; By the Danube

Since the end of the 1970s, the Hungarian public has been increasingly involved with the problems of nation, national self-consciousness, ethnicity and nationalities, and during this time these concerns have grown into a central topic of intellectual discussion and reflection. "Slowly, we can no longer open a periodical without spotting an article in the table of contents which analyzes the national and ethnic problem. Mostly history is cited as material for the arguments."¹ "They speak of the "renaissance of the national and nationality problem" and the of the "ethnic revolution." Scholars and representatives of public life believe that they can note that "the ethnic character coming into consciousness has become an important historical force."²

This subject has indeed seized the entire mass media of the country. Hardly a month goes by without some aspect of this complex problem being addressed by a ranking politician, author or social scientist. The revitalization of national self-consciousness in Hungary, which can thereby be perceived and which has even become incalculable, may have manifold, individually different motivations. According to statements by Hungarian scientists, there are three reasons of particular importance:

- 1) The taboo placed on the topics "national" and "nation" which lasted well into the 1960s and even now has an uncertain aftereffect.
- 2) The delayed elaboration of contemporary Hungarian history from 1918 on, which was only started in the 1970s and was initially set on a broad basis in the media of fictional literature and memoirs.
- 3) The pressing realization of "one's own limits" in three areas: economic (questioning the optimism for progress because of a crisis in growth), political (limits to reform of the political system) and social (consumption, quality of life, social equality and mobility), after the prolonged upward movement and boom in these areas has come to a standstill for the time being.

It was precisely the "realization of limits" in connection with the growing criticism of the "too exclusively economic interpretation of society and life"³ which contributed decisively to the actualization of the problem of national self-consciousness. The discussion centers around the problem of which forces of cohesion and preservation of the community, which integration factors and which elements of consensus by an entire community are still present or could be mobilized after those which were derived from the positive experiences in the three areas mentioned had lost--at least partially--their earlier effectiveness and prominence. The implicit question is raised thereby not only about the possibilities of identification of the individual with society, of citizens with the political system, but also--since society and the political control system are organized within a nation-state framework--the question is raised about the identification of the individual with the nation.

This question stipulates a deep contemplation to define the contents and value of "nation" and also the determinants of "national self-consciousness." In its search for "national identity" as an important orientation factor for its future development, Hungarian society also articulates a newly sensed historical consciousness and shows an interest--by increasingly wider sections of its society--in the questions of national history. Expressed differently--in the words of Istvan Lazar, member of the editorial staff of the journal VALOSAG--this interest represents less a clear need for knowledge and much more a "questioning frame of mind." And the search for its own national past is simultaneously an element of the "search for its own direction, of the struggle to determine the station of modern Hungarian society and to achieve a national self-consciousness 'adequate for the realities'."⁴

The answers to these complex problems are, on the one hand, deductions from the historical experiences of the national past, including its most recent period, and, on the other hand, extrapolations of the current development. That is, the prospects postulated by the actual situation determine both how to formulate the problem itself and what goals the answers to be given should have.⁵

This circumstance is emphatically documented by Hungarian testimonials. After all, Hungarian intellectuals mostly use, as a starting point for their publicly expounded reflections, the state of individual and social identity disturbances and the question of their causes, that is, the given conditions and developments

to which the nation is currently exposed and through which the national self-consciousness becomes "relativized"--in the words of Peter Hanak, the historian. While the authors Gyorgy Szaraz and Ferenc Glatz put more emphasis here on the relationship to global causes and effects in the developmental process of the world economy and society, Hanak points out more the specific Hungarian causes, which he derives from the national peculiarities of historical development (including the most recent period) and the structural idiosyncrasies of Hungarian society.

Glatz refers especially to the globally valid developmental trend of technical civilization in the direction of unification and homogenization, and also to the "prospect of integration" contained in the "future view" of socialism which makes it appear that "the elimination of differences and individualities in the culture of mankind are basic prerequisites of development." According to Glatz, "this integration--as the principal trend of historical development--should still be accomplished more under the critical preservation of multiplicity than under its destruction!" Such a conscious preservation of multiplicity and thereby also of ethnic and national individuality has also led to "ethnic revival" as a "fashionable current of the times" in Hungary.⁶

Hanak's analysis, concerned more with the specifics of Hungarian development, proceeds from the experiences of World War II and the socialistic transformation of the country. In his words, "World War II was a bitter lesson for Hungary about the massive realities of power relations" which has led, "finally, a majority of Hungarians to a sobering realization of the position of the country in the gravitational field of the international powers and thereby to a relativization of national self-consciousness." "The reciprocal relationships which were developed with the socialist countries have put on a new base and into a new form the feeling of the relativity of (Hungary's) international position and consciousness of reciprocity as a basis for internationalism."

But otherwise, observes Hanak, "the material reconstruction after the war was more rapid and emphatic than the psychic one, and the past in its entirety remained unsettled." According to Hanak, this means that Hungarian society "without making the effort to undergo a self-analysis, and without bringing a consciousness of its own self to maturity, gained entry to the solemn land of socialist promises." "The errors of the postwar period and the unexpected conflicts in building the new world" at the same time made the consciousness of relativity--by itself healthy--"a source of uncertainty and doubt," a doubt "which today extends not only to the realistic evaluation of the position and role of Hungary but also to the national self-consciousness itself and to the picture of the future." The "clarity of the national identity" and of the concept "nation" was thereby exposed to questions.⁷

What then is the political-historical definition of "nation" in Hungary today and what consequences are derived from it for current Hungarian policies such as for Hungarian national consciousness, which itself is again applied critically and reflexively to these policies?

"Nationalism Debate"

The efforts toward a meaningful definition of "nation" are almost always in the context of "nationalism debates" which have been going on since 1959. Evoked by the experiences of 1956, which exposed the undiminished virulence of traditional Hungarian nationalism, the "nationalism debate" of 1959 was instituted by a smaller circle of historians, spread in every widening circles and reached several highpoints (1963, 1968, 1973).

It has been stated often enough that Marxist-Leninist philosophy, because of its speculative historical premises and its use of the class concept as the analytical category for the study of historical processes, would be incapable of providing a theory of nationalism.⁸ Nevertheless, both politicians and theoreticians also find themselves confronted with the "nationalism" phenomenon in modern socialist societies. Using the dialectically conceived pair of concepts of "socialist patriotism-socialist internationalism," they attempt to lend a definition to this phenomenon which conforms to their system.

The stage reached by such discussions in the course of the "nationalism debates" by the mid-1970s in Hungary is documented by the following utterances from the historian Jenő Szucs: "'Socialist patriotism' must express the new type of relationship which was formed in the correlation among socialist development, state and nation." In contrast with the "state patriotism" in earlier centuries and "citizen patriotism," which turned into a "national patriotism" and was simultaneously dependent on both the theoretical and practical realization of "nation" and also on the mode of interpretation of "nationalism," "socialist patriotism" is a "state patriotism" insofar as it has expressed the relationship between the entire society and the state. At the same time, it is also a "national patriotism" insofar as it also draws from the modern national traditions and formulates a new conception of the "nation."⁹

Both the state and the nation are objects of the socialist coinage of patriotism. Otherwise, their importance becomes relative because socialist patriotism, by its essence, is also internationalism. As "state patriotism," it integrates the socialist gains into the national consciousness; as "national patriotism," it integrates the entire history, traditions, customs and culture of the Hungarian people. Insofar as "the historical consciousness ... is an important, even decisive element of the national consciousness"¹⁰ and also represents a structural element of every ethnic group consciousness, national consciousness is not conceivable without history, even under socialism.

The lasting result and actual novelty of the "nationalism debate" is the smooth integration of the entire history of Hungary into the "new type of national consciousness," because "national consciousness is healthy only if it also acknowledges the past in the name of the present."¹¹

In contrast, during the 1950s, the "national aspects" of history were admitted only to the extent to which they supported the perspective of the Marxist interpretation of history--which, at the time, was even more dogmatically restricted--as "revolutionary progressive" and which condemned as bourgeois nationalist or reactionary all other traditions, historical events and correlations which could not be brought to this denominator.

With the by no means uncritically accomplished acknowledgement of the entire history of the country as a contextually structural element of the national consciousness, the "nationalism debate" developed a new dynamism insofar as, from the newly gained and considerably greater total correlations, it decisively widened its perspective. Important individual historical events, for instance the current history from 1918, could not be discussed more freely and frequently and could be put in a new context which demanded continued reflection.

With the more intensive elaboration of current history (including its most recent period), clear shifts in emphasis were perceptible in the "nationalism debate." From the aspect of content, the concept "ethnos" has increasingly shifted to the center of debate since 1979; from a formal aspect, the tendency toward popularization became stronger. In association with the thematic shift, the debate has also become increasingly political and soon also touched upon the problem of those belonging to the Hungarian ethnos who live in the territories of neighboring countries.

Nation-Ethnicum

In 1981, Peter Hanak raised the provocative question: "Who is Hungarian, who belongs to the nation? Is it, strictly speaking, only the country's population of Hungarian nationality or also those Hungarians living outside of the boundaries in neighboring countries and all those who emigrated to foreign countries? In school instruction, adult education, the news and public announcements so far, it has not been unequivocally clarified: is there one Hungarian nation living in the Danube Basin with one language and one culture but different citizenships, or are there several?"¹²

Gyorgy Szaraz provides the answer to Hanak, which can be considered totally official: "In the Danube Basin live not 'one Hungarian nation and four related national minorities' but 'one Hungarian ethnicum with one culture but different citizenships', an ethnicum whose groups living outside of the Hungarian state boundaries are bound, by citizenship and patriotic loyalty, to the country in which they live. But with respect to their language, their traditions, their culture and their ethnic self-consciousness, these groups are part of a single Hungarian ethnicum. Their fate cannot be a matter of indifference to us just as we consider it natural that the fate of minorities living with us cannot be a matter of indifference to their mother country."¹³

The question raised here about a criterium of belonging to the nation is derived from the paired concepts: nation-ethnicum where the concept ethnicum embraces more and represents the substrata to some extent. The difficulty lies in the closer definition of the relationship between ethnicum and nation, that is, between the Hungarian national groups living outside of Hungary and the nation, and in providing a more convincing formula than before to the participants of the discussion. Apparently, even Szaraz cannot provide this. Nevertheless, it follows from his and Hanak's statements, that, in contrast to older tradition, in present Hungary the West European national concept is more preferred, that is, belonging to a nation is equated with citizenship and is rooted in the adherence of the individual to the nation.¹⁴

In doing so, one starts from the nation-state frame in its present territorial extent: "The Hungarian is one who professes himself to be one.... Namely, if there is a national constitution, then this is determined by those 10 million Magyars who are active here and now and represent themselves as such."¹⁵

Also engaged in finding a theoretically based clarification of the relationship between ethnicum and nation, which would be applicable to current socialist conditions, is Tibor Huszar, the chairman of sociology department at Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest. Following the newly developed national type in 1917, the countries of Eastern Europe have codified themselves as "socialist nations" after 1945. Although they exhibit "many specifics different from each other, nevertheless the common characteristics of their development is the preservation of the national framework and the filling of this framework with new contents.... The given historical conditions are the reason that we distinguish among ethnicum, nation and nationality. Ethnicum is the formation with the longest past. It is bound by common language, culture and historical tradition."¹⁶ Under socialist conditions also, we consider as a nation the ethnicum which has independent statehood.... A nationality is an ethnicum with minority status. An adequate interpretation of this concept, from the standpoint of the harmoniousness of our national self-consciousness, is important in two respects. On the one hand, because on the territory of present Hungary ... there are nationalities; on the other hand, because on the territory of neighboring countries there are solid blocks of Hungarian nationalities whose sense of belonging as citizens and national (ethnic--editor) consciousness of identity do not necessarily coincide: they are loyal citizens of the socialist state on whose territory they live and which grants them equal rights, free use of their mother tongue and the exercise of their culture, while the common historical past and tradition binds them to the mother nation.¹⁷

Subsequently, Huszar undertakes to connect the question of the relationship between ethnicum and nation with the concept of partial identity, because for members of the Hungarian ethnicum with minority status, there is a "specific dualism" (Huszar) in their national identity. On the one hand, they are citizens of the country in which they live, and therefore from a political standpoint they are members of the nation-state. On the other hand, they still don't belong to it ethnically. Therefore, they have a partial political identity which binds them to the nation-states as citizens and a partial ethnic identity which binds them to their mother nation, above all, culturally.

The actualization of either the one or the other partial identity appears to be somewhat less problematic when shown by the examples of various historical epochs before and after 1918, only if the framework conditions for such a realization are about equal. The equality of framework conditions appears to be sufficiently provided through the establishment of the socialist social system in Hungary and in the neighboring countries with large Hungarian minorities, so that for a long time a certain "automatic solution" to the nationality problem was relied on.¹⁸

In spite of equal or similar framework conditions, the "socialist nations" still "exhibit specifics different from each other"--according to Huszar. The greater these are--for instance, the mother nation follows a cultural policy different from that of the nation-state to which the Hungarian minority belongs at a given

time--the stronger will be the tensions derived from this "dualism" and from the effort to realize both partial identities simultaneously. This problem is discussed by Huszar in the following: "If the principles of Leninist nationality policies are consequently and fittingly adhered to--and, as shown by the positive and negative experiences--only then will the specific dynamism not become a source of tensions, and the nationalities will indeed be able to fulfill their function as bridges between the peoples living in this area."¹⁹

Building the National State and Socialist National Consciousness

According to Huszar, the important prerequisite for such a development is to fill the retained national framework "with a new content." According to him, this means that "after restructuring the production conditions, ... lifting the class oppositions already to the present level of development--at least in principle ... the political conditions are given to establish national unity and international class solidarity." Naturally, Huszar concedes that, in practice, these principles are "not realized everywhere with equal consistency," especially not in countries "where, before the (1848) revolution, the process of nation formation by the citizens was not completed and the nationalist tendencies are strong."²⁰

This statement by Huszar can claim validity both in Hungary and, for instance, in Romania insofar as Huszar defines the completion of the process of nation formation by the citizens as the institutionalization of a social-political system of the "citizen democracy" type. Such could not be maintained during the period between the wars in either country. On the other hand, the years between 1945 and 1948--"this effervescent period of liberation and finding of the self..., this hopeful time rich in good starts"²¹--were not enough to have a corresponding political culture developed.

The differently structured national consciousness of the Romanian and Hungarian peoples is indeed derived more from the different course of the territorial nation-state formation at the time. In comparison with the Hungarian, the formation of the Romanian state was late in completion. Only in 1918 was it merged into a nation-state unity by the unification of Transylvania with Moldavia and Walachia, the three territories which--according to Romanian comprehension--have always belonged together. This delayed formation of the nation, on the one hand, and its repeated jeopardy by the Second Vienna Dictate (separation of Northern Transylvania in favor of Hungary in 1940) may explain a certain potential for aggression in Romanian nationalism, at least as far as it is manifested against Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Romania.

The Hungarian development is, in turn, marked by three hard defeats which have considerably influenced the building of a Hungarian national state in the modern sense: the defeat of 1849 which delayed the constitutional establishment of the Hungarian national state--under somewhat limited conditions which were strongly criticized in wide circles--until 1867; the defeat in 1918 which led to the loss of two-thirds of the territory and one-third of the Magyar population (Trianon); and third, the result of the war in 1945 which reaffirmed the defeat of 1918 with the boundary lines drawn at the time.

These negative historical experiences solidified to a trauma in the Hungarian national consciousness because they had been vastly repressed and treated as taboo. A part of this suppression process is the long-neglected evaluation of current Hungarian history from 1918 to the present. Just in the last few months, a number of Hungarian intellectuals have addressed this problem.²² The suppression led to the "formation of irrational foci of infection in the national consciousness" and thereby to a tendency "to make distorted nostalgia and fears the starting point for the reinterpretation of history."²³ The "inclination toward a brooding search for the fatalities of Hungarian history (in Hungarian, "balsors Kutatas")--according to historian Gyula Juhasz--"with its irrational demagogy, exerts today a pressure on historical sciences from below," namely the pressure to give in to maintaining emotional expectations and to present the national past like an idealized picture. And this, "after Hungarian historical science succeeded in freeing itself from pressure from above," had a similar effect on it--even though its content had a different accent.²⁴

Among others, it is due to this earlier ideologic-dogmatic pressure that the presentation of the October Revolution of 1917 and of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was given such weight and used up so much space that other important historical events such as the defeat of Hungary in 1918 and the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920 with all its consequences were put in the background and were not reflected upon.

To what extent the suppression phenomenon and its effects on the political culture of the country are now also occupying the State and Party leadership becomes clear from the plan submitted by Gyorgy Jozsa, head of the main section of the Culture Ministry for Instruction in Marxism-Leninism, "to introduce a new subject of study ... in all institutions of higher learning ... which should present a cohesive picture of the political history of Hungary from 1917 until today, but should mainly deal with the problems of our history after 1945." As the functionary explains: "Namely, there are periods and topics, especially as we approach the present, for which there are no adequate analyses available. But if we indeed want to provide help for the audience to orient themselves in the present conditions, then we must offer them the opportunity to become acquainted with the authentic history of the most recent past."²⁵

Not last, this also means "taking possession of that quarter of a century which has raised the country economically and culturally up to its present standing," that is, assimilating the experiences of the last 25 years because--according to Gyorgy Aczel--the national consciousness of our people is derived not only from the past but, more than ever, also bears the stamp of the present."²⁷

With respect to the historiographic "mastery" of the most recent past, if only because of the shorter distance in time, one can speak less of an omission than of the scarce elaboration of various eras of contemporary history from 1917/18 to 1956, particularly because, according to Huszar and Kosary, "the present social national consciousness is actually determined by the period between the wars."²⁸

Before Trianon is discussed as an exemplary case for this observation, it must first be stated that if one considers the most recent self-testimonials of

Hungarian society with respect to their national and historical consciousness, then there are two seemingly countercurrent flows the confrontation of which makes the discussion of this complex problem extraordinarily intensive. First, there is an effort promoted mostly by the Party leadership to integrate the history of the last quarter of a century into the national and also historical consciousness of Hungarian society; second, there is a tendency sustained by wide circles, especially by intellectuals, to work up modern Hungarian history, from 1917/18 on, in its entirety in the course of rediscovering the ethnicum and the Hungarian minorities outside the national boundaries, and also to contemplate that course under the national aspect.

One attempts to put into history the buildup period of Hungarian socialism and thereby to anchor it in the national consciousness more lastingly than before. The other attempts politically to actualize the national consciousness in order to gain a foothold in the present from the sum of solid historical experiences of the older generation--no longer suppressed but by now analyzed--which should serve the younger generation (also of Hungarian minorities) as an aid in orientation. These efforts express themselves, in part, in a contradictory manner. Nevertheless, they have no basically opposing aims but differ more in where their emphasis is placed.²⁹

Trianon

In the words of historian Peter Hanak, up to this day Hungarian society did not succeed in truly coming to terms with Trianon in its consciousness. "The nationalistic revision policy of the Horthy regime and Hungary's role in World War II appears to have compromised an objectively critical analysis of the Trianon Peace Treaty to such an extent that the words get stuck in our throat.... Without an analysis of the varied consequences of Trianon, it is impossible for us to comprehend the Hungarian spirit and the national consciousness in the 20th Century. ..."³⁰ Ferenc Glatz also pleads for a profound understanding, above all, of the social-psychological effects: "The historian must articulate that there was not a single folk group in world history, even during the period when the national states were established, which would have watched with resignation the loss of two-thirds of its territory from the brief perspective of two generations."³¹

The collapse of Old Hungary with its "1,000 year old" boundaries at the end of World War I was sealed by the Peace Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920). Trianon is the historical beginning of the current problems with nationalities. About 3 million Magyars were separated from the mother country; furthermore, exactly 190,000 square kilometers of the historical territory (that is, 67.2 percent) were relinquished to the successor states of the former Danube monarchy. This included Transylvania, which was considered the "Magyar nuclear region," with the Banat and the Partium (the counties Arad, Bihar, Szatmar, Maramaros) regions allocated to the Romanian Kingdom.³²

There are still lively controversies flaring up between Hungarian and Romanian historiographers with respect to the evaluation of Trianon and the regional history of Transylvania. While in Hungary, the drawing of the Trianon boundaries is accepted as a consequence of the defeat in 1918 and a result of the constellation of European powers at the time, the Romanians see Trianon as the

the successful conclusion of the historical process of building their own national state, traced back all the way to Dacia and the Dacians. In this context, the purpose of a historicizing legitimization ideology is fulfilled by the Daco-Romanian continuity theory--elevated to quasi-dogmatic status only in socialist Romania--which is often played off against Hungary and the Magyar minority in Transylvania.

This theory encounters a decisive rejection by Hungarian historical science and not only for professional-scientific reasons but also because the Hungarian historians reject a political instrumentalization of the writing of history. Composed by Peter Hanak, the closing statement of the round table discussion, organized in 1979 by four outstanding representatives of Hungarian historical science, on "The Peoples of the Carpathian Basin before the Hungarian Conquest" is a school example of pointed criticism involving such an instrumentalization on the part of the Romanians:

"The continuity ... is the brainchild of chroniclers and historiographers.... In the process of establishing the national consciousness 150-200 years ago, such myths could undoubtedly have had their positive propagandistic effect. But meanwhile, science overtook the myths. Science as a process of learning about the self requires precisely the historical criticism of myths. We can reconstruct, in a scientifically acceptable manner and true to realities, the ethnic, cultural and settlement conditions of the Danube region during the great national migration period only if we free research from every intention to use history for the legitimization of current sovereignty conditions. Besides, the interstate and internal power relations of this region will not be decided by discussions involving ancient inhabitants and historical priority."³³

Indeed it has to be noted that up to the 1960s Hungarian historical science was also exposed to the pressures of political instrumentalization. How this pressure worked, for instance in the handling of the Trianon complex and its consequences--particularly relevant for national self-interpretations--is illustrated by the following critical statement by Istvan Nemeskurty: "The bitter facts of the peace decisions in the Paris suburb, which contain lessons also valid today, for a long time could not be addressed or even intimated, and if someone would bring up the subject, it could easily happen that he would be stamped with Cain's mark of chauvinism. But such a sneaking around the hot dish, the nonexpression of things and a timid suppression provide a culture medium richer than all others for the bacterium of chauvinism and aggressive nationalism. On the other hand, what we express will cease to be shrouded in secrecy and fate and will become clarified into simple and instructive fact."³⁴

But the elucidation of "facts" still does not seem to proceed so simply and unequivocally. Just in most recent times, there can again be detected some efforts on part of the Party history writers in Hungary to provide evidence that the Communist Party of Hungary and the regime of the Soviet Republic have no complicity whatsoever in Trianon³⁶ by emphasizing that the Comintern³⁵ condemned Trianon.

Determination of the National Position

What historical-political inferences are drawn from Trianon in Hungary today?

It must be made clear from the beginning that it is not at all territorial revision. Already in 1958, Janos Kadar declared in Parliament: "The Hungarian People's Republic raises no demands, either territorial or any other, against other countries."³⁷ In 1958, this was perhaps the declaration of the Party leadership alone, but today it has obviously become a constituent part of the political culture of the country and the subject of consensus by the entire society. According to Szaraz: "In this country with its 10 million citizens, there cannot be any normally, reasonably and responsibly thinking individuals who would dream about the 1,000 year old boundaries and indulge in the thought of a Hungarian imperium."³⁸

In this resolute rejection of all revisionist thoughts--not at all in resigned renunciation--a new national self-consciousness of Hungarian society is manifested, a self-consciousness which had overcome both the "negative prejudice ... of self-contempt, which cannot lend any nation a healthy consciousness of identity" and "the mythologization of the past which always lands into opposition to the 'romantic' mythology of other nations."³⁹

Such a self-consciousness--according to Gyorgy Aczel "one of the most important spiritual forces of cohesion in socialist Hungary"--makes it possible "not to answer nationalism, chauvinism and national hate with nationalism, chauvinism and national hate."⁴⁰

From the point of view of practical intelligence, "the often mentioned consciousness of identity" in its everyday form must take on "the manageable identification with economic goals, with societal striving for a new quality ... of the technical and social culture which manifests itself in production and consumption."⁴¹

But obviously, there remain problems precisely in the everyday actualization of the consciousness of identity: "When the festival-like euphoria of our patriotism, set in red letters, vanishes, we tolerate badly the gray, commonplace reality that, in our everyday affairs, we are first of all ourselves and only after that active Hungarians."⁴² According to Nemeskurty, this documents a traditional behavior which had already been criticized by Istvan Szechenyi, the great 19th century reformer, with the following words: "We acquiesce in the self-satisfying confirmation that we are Magyars as if this would already be a merit by itself."⁴³

In the intellectual discussion centered around the question of the historical-political place of Hungary in Europe, this self-contentment is felt less, however. Rather, the critical evaluation of historical experiences and the resolution of national traumas are more perceptible here. The answers to the question of Hungary's place in the present and the future reflect not only the starting situation created by Trianon and reconfirmed after 1945 but also additional complex relationships of the entire national history, especially of the last 2 centuries.

This is also true of situation analyses which start out with modern global developmental trends and draw conclusions for Hungary from them. A typical example is provided by the arguments of Gyorgy Szaraz. The author begins his reflection with the view that ideas such as that "global unity would be achieved suddenly or in the course of some world revolution" have become obsolete. The process of unification would rather proceed by step through the formation of regional economic-political units which in turn will themselves be the basis for larger units. Applied to Hungary, this reflection presents the question to Szaraz:

"Don't we have to consider the possibility of such a regional unit in a group of states which, with regard to their common past, their economy and policies being dependent on each other, have the same social order and are also joined to each other through their nationalities, a group of states in the Danube Basin which indeed represents a large geographic unity. And when it becomes evident that such cooperation is not only possible but is increasingly becoming a regional necessity, could it not sooner or later become reality which seems to us a beautiful dream now: the spiritualization of boundaries?"⁴⁴

The maxim "By the Danube--here must you live!" (Pach) reflects the basic realization of the political, economic and cultural interdependence of states, peoples and folk groups in the Danube-Carpathian Basin. It is characteristic of the pragmatic behavior of Budapest to have derived from this the imperative of mutual cooperation without linking it to confederation plans of the traditional style.

With respect to the standing of Hungary in Europe, for about a decade the question has been universally answered by classifying the country in the East-Central European region. Hungary is thereby assigned a middle and, at the same time, mediating position between Western and Eastern Europe, a position also characteristic of its older traditions.⁴⁵

What would this East-Central Europe and Danube-Carpathian Basin conception mean with respect to the problems of nationalities in the country, and of Hungarian minorities across the borders? For the first time this problem of nationalities will be tied together in a greater, total relationship by this conception, which--as a supplement to "proletarian internationalism"--makes possible a critical distance from its own Hungarian nationalism while it questions neither the minority status of nationalities nor their anchoring as citizens. Moreover, this conception should form the ideal framework not only for a closer interstate cooperation in this region but also precisely for increased cultural exchange between ethnic Hungarians with minority status and the Hungarian mother nation without--and this appears particularly relevant politically--its touching the status quo, including ideology, in any way whatsoever.

The Hungarian People's Republic attempts to counter a possible escalation of nationality problems in the Danube region through a foreign policy principally aimed at maintaining and enhancing friendly relations with the neighboring states. With the East-Central Europe conception, this performance would be intensified and would also have its upshot in the concept of "the function of nationalities as bridges"; it would also find--over and above the history of socialist Hungary--legitimation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ferenc Glatz, "Questions with Respect to Ethnicum and Nation at the End of the 20th Century," HISTORIA 4, 1982 4/5, p 34.
2. Lajos Fur, "Nationality Problems and Scientific Nationality Studies," VALOSAG 25, 1982 1, pp 34-46; citation p 34.
3. MAGYAR NEMZET, 4 July 1982, review of the book by Elemer Hankiss, "Diagnozisok" [Diagnoses], Budapest, 1982.
4. Istvan Lazar, "Reply Point by Point," KRITIKA, 1978 11, p 7; Lazar's article is a contribution to the discussion on "What Is Our Spriritual Life?" which was published in the cultural-political-literary periodical KRITIKA at the end of 1978. See Kathrin Sitzler, "An Experiment at Discussion in Hungary," WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DIENST SUEOSTEUROPA 27, 1978 1/2, pp 27-32.
5. The bases for this section are mainly the following expositions, employed as contributions to a discussion, by three well-known Hungarian intellectuals: Peter Hanak, "Relative National Consciousness," ELET ES IRODALOM, 25 Jul 81, pp 4-5; Gyorgy Szaraz, "What Should We Do With History? Answer to Peter Hanak," Ibid., pp 5-6; and Ferenc Glatz, "Questions Regarding Ethnicum," Ibid., pp 34-36.
6. Ferenc Glatz, "Questions Regarding Ethnicum," Ibid., p 34.
7. Peter Hanak, "Relative National Consciousness," p 4.
8. See Leszek Kolakowski, "Marxist Philosophy and National Reality" in Kolakowski, "Der revolutionare Geist" [The Revolutionary Spirit], Stuttgart, 1972, p 37; also Boris Meissner, "Nationality Problems and Soviet Ideology" in "Nationalitatenprobleme in der Scwjetunion und Osteuropa" [Nationality Problems in the Soviet Union and East Europe], Koln, 1982, pp 11-44.
9. Jeno Szucs, "Nation und Geschichte" [Nation and History], Budapest, 1981, p 139.
10. Ibid., p 140.
11. Tibor Huszar, "National Existence--National Consciousness," VALOSAG 25, 1982-8, p 31.
12. Peter Hanak, "Relative National Consciousness," p 4.
13. Gyorgy Szaraz, "What Should We Do With History?", p 6.
14. "Since the French Revolution, the voluntary principle, the free will as the nucleus for self-determination, is indeed the central point. Who is French is measured not by language and origin but by an acknowledgement of the mother country...." Hans Rothfels, "Die Nationsidee in westlicher und ostlicher Sicht" [The Idea of Nation in the View of the East and the West],

Koln-Braunsfeld, 1956, p 10. In this context, Rothfels also cites the famous definition by Ernst Renan, "The existence of a nation is the lasting self-determination of the people."

15. Ivan Vitanyi, director of the Institute of Building Research in Budapest, in an interview by Vilma Komor in MAGYAR NEMZET, 5 Feb 1983, p 7.
16. This definition of ethnicum corresponds more to the "Eastern" idea of a nation characterized by Rothfels as follows: "belonging to the nation ... among the various ethnic and language groups of Central and Eastern Europe was connected not with a clear concept of political nationality or even a subjective nationality.... In this sense, nationality had little to do with the state and also the self-determination; it was something original and organically growing, the base which carried all cultural expressions, all that was specific in the life of peoples...." (Hans Rothfels, "Die Nationsidee," p 11.
17. Tibor Huszar, "National Existence--National Consciousness," p 32.
18. See Lajos Fur, "Nationality Problems and Scientific Nationality Studies," VALOSAG 25, 1982 1, pp 34-36. On p 42, Fur explains, to the end of the 1960s, Party and governmental circles were dominated by the concept that "under the conditions of socialism, the nationality problem would soon solve itself automatically in our country and also in the neighboring countries."
19. Tibor Huszar, "National Existence--National Consciousness," p 32.
20. Ibid., p 33; see also the following passage from the most recent speech by Gyorgy Aczel at the opening of the State Conference on Problems of Agitation, Propaganda and Cultural Policy, 11 Jan 1983, in Budapest: "It turned out that the principles of the Leninist nationality policy did not acquire automatic validity in the countries which entered the socialist road." NEPSZABADSAG, 15 Jan 1983, p 5.
21. Otto Major, "Mature Country--Mature Literature," ELET ES IRODALOM, Feb 1983 4, p 4.
22. See also Miklos Meszoly, "Consciousness and National Consciousness," VALOSAG 25, 1982 12, pp 23-33; further, Imre Bata in his commentary at the above-mentioned State Conference on Problems of Agitation, Propaganda and Cultural Policy, 11/12 Jan 1983, ELET ES IRODALOM, 21 Jan 1983, p 1.
23. MAGYAR HIRLAP, 15 Jan 1983, p 9.
24. See MAGYAR NEMZET, 5 Feb 1983, p 7.
25. MAGYAR HIRLAP, 29 Jan 1983, p 9.
26. Imre Bata, "The Cultural Policy Forum," ELET ES IRODALOM, 21 Jan 1983, p 1.

27. Gyorgy Aczel in his speech on 11 Jan 1983, already cited, NEPSZABADSAG, 15 Jan 1983, p 5.
28. The two papers by Huszar and Kosary, referred to in footnotes 11 and 22, are addressed. The formulation itself comes from Janos Toth, deputy director of the Institute of Adult Education in Budapest; MAGYAR NEMZET, 5 Feb 1983, p 7.
29. See also, for instance, Janos Toth, "Just as patriotism, in the form of idealism, ethics and perceptiveness can, in terms of feelings, be associated with a conservative, substance-preserving interpretation, in my opinion it can also be associated with ideas and trends which promote socialist democracy." MAGYAR NEMZET, 5 Feb 1983, p 7.
30. Peter Hanak, "Relative National Consciousness," p 4.
31. Ferenc Glatz, "Questions Regarding Ethnicum," p 34.
32. For a statistical review of the "territorial, demographic and economic changes in Hungary, 1920" see HISTORIA 4, 1982 4/5, p 51.
33. HISTORIA 1, 1979 1, p 28, cited here from the translation by Kathrin Sitzler in WISSEHSCHAFTLICHER DIENST SUEDEUROPA 28, 1979, p 254.
34. Istvan Nemeskurty, "Hungarian Thinkers," MAGYAR NEMZET, 29 Jan 1983, p 9.
35. Laszlo Kovago, "The Communist Party and Trianon," HISTORIA 3, 1981 2, pp 7-9.
36. Gabor Szekely, "The Comintern and the Peace Treaty of Versailles," HISTORIA 4, 1981 4/5, pp 42-44.
37. NEPSZABADSAG, 28 Jan 1958, p 3.
38. Gyorgy Szaraz, "What Should We Do With History?", p 6.
39. Tibor Huszar, "National Existence--National Consciousness," p 33.
40. NEPSZABADSAG, 15 Jan 1983, p 5.
41. Tibor Vamos, director of the Research Institute of Computer Technology and Automatization, at the State Conference on Agitation, Propaganda and Cultural Policy, 11/12 Jan 1983, p 4.
42. Istvan Nemeskurty, MAGYAR NEMZET, 29 Jan 1983, p 9.
43. Ibid.
44. Gyorgy Szaraz, "What Should We Do With History?", p 6.
45. Jeno Szucs, "Sketch of the Three Historical Regions of Europe," TORTENELMI SZEMLE 24, 1981, pp 313-359; Ivan T. Berend, "Hungary's Place in Europe," VALOSAG 25, 1982 12, pp 1-22; see also Gerhard Seewann, "Historical Science

and Politics in Hungary 1950-1980." "The Historiography of the Middle Ages and Modern Times," SUEOST-FORSCHUNGEN 41, 1982, pp 251-323, especially Chapter III: "The Concept of East Europe--A Way Out from the Crisis in National Historiography," p 305.

46. "The nationalities in Hungary and the people of Hungarian nationality living in the neighboring countries are considered communities which, in many respects but especially with respect to culture, could play the role of a bridge, an inspiring role between the individual countries. We are of the opinion that the economic, political and cultural cooperation with the neighboring socialist countries will also be of help." Cited from Gyorgy Aczel's opening speech at the State Conference on Agitation, Propaganda and Cultural Policy, 11 Jan 1983, NEPSZABADSAG, 15 Jan 1983, p 5.

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SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF GYPSIES DISCUSSED

Prejudice, Fate

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 23 Apr 83 pp 37-41

/Text/ In the beginning of March our article about the Gypsies appeared and now we publish the comments we received in our forthcoming issues. Since the domestic situation of the gypsies is a paramount socioeconomic problem, we consider it important to reproduce fully the contributions of members of gypsy coordination committees as well as those of our other readers.

Fact Prejudices

Commentary by Mrs Istvan Kozak, Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee of the Council of Ministers:

The title "smoky images" reflects the reality; indeed the article darkens the situation and takes a dim view of it. If it could inspire discussion, as its introduction suggests, it would not cause aversion since the theses which can be discussed must also be discussed. But we cannot agree with a writing which is not based on proper research and thus is obsolete, in many respects is wrong and is supported by an arbitrary selection of national statistics and local surveys. The author fails to report about the changes which have occurred during the last 20 years and "freezing," i.e., accepting as static 5-10-15 year old data, does not bring us closer to a solution of the gypsy problem. Since the author's intention to help is obvious, it is unexplainable why he tells the readers that hardly anything has changed during the last couple of years, and the measures taken by the government did not live up to expectations.

Thus, in the first place, I do not want to argue but only to complete and correct the data provided by the author of the article.

First of all, I wish to note that the "researchers" cited by the article should already correct their presage concerning the growth of the gypsy population since, as a result of family planning increasingly prevalent among them, their birth rate has been decreasing lately and their number will most likely run below 450,000 by the end of this century. This of course does not diminish the socio-

political importance of the problem, but I wish to reassure all those who, as we can read further on in the course of the article, feel that our society is "in jeopardy."

In the second paragraph the author says that there is no detailed information available concerning the employment of the gypsies because they are not officially considered as a nationality and most enterprises and state offices do not keep records of their employees in this respect. It is surprising that the author does not know that "most enterprises and state offices" do not record the ethnic origin of their employees (why should they?), but the village and city councils and the Bureau for Local Councils of the Council of Ministers possess much more data on the situation, employment and life of the gypsies than on any other ethnic group.

Also in connection with the employment of the gypsies the article notes that "according to the reports of the county councils the number of gypsies who have adapted themselves to regular work has increased during the 1970's. The picture is not accurate above all because each survey uses a different criterion for regular occupation. Thus some of them also categorize occasional jobs over a few days as regular occupation." Conversely, according to the reports of the county councils (every county administration prepares such reports) as well as a 1971 survey made by the Sociological Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, able-bodied adult gypsy males were working at the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's in the same proportion as their non-gypsy counterparts. The rate of gypsy females who undertook regular work was 30 percent in 1971 and is now approximately 50 percent. A great number has also accepted occasional or seasonal jobs on a regular basis.

May I observe also that it is not true that each survey uses a different criterion for regular occupations. The criteria thereof are the same for both gypsies and nongypsies. Occasional jobs can be distinguished from regular ones regardless of the workers' ethnic origin. And insofar as the accuracy of the statistics is concerned there is neither a daily record nor a national summary concerning the employment of the gypsies. Thus I do not know what kind of source Andras B. Balint was using with reference to the division of gypsies among the various industrial sectors and their place in the hierarchy of employment. No such record has been worked out in the 1980's and earlier statistics have changed substantially, according to reports received from the county administrations. For example in agriculture their ratio of employment was 10 to 15 percent in the early 1970's, and since then the ratio of gypsy workers in that sector has increased. The ratio of skilled gypsy workers, even if it had been low, reached 11 percent already in 1971, and therefore the author's statement that it is now around 2 or 3 percent is nonsense.

According to the author of the article, "a substantial part of the gypsy families makes its living, aside from the men's occasional jobs, on family allowance and child-care benefits in cases of families with various children." This statement reflects a widespread 20 year old prejudice. Regrettably enough, while the author tries to represent the gypsies' interests, he turns the uninformed readers against them by his "findings," which do not correspond to the reality. I think that anyone who writes about such subjects should know that in Hungary family

allowance is due only to working people, depending on the number of children. In terms of the pertinent government decree only persons who have worked at least 21 days in a month are entitled to family allowance. If we deduct Sundays and the free Saturdays from a worker's monthly schedule it becomes clear that only persons who work very regularly can benefit from this allocation. And insofar as the child-care benefits are concerned, all young Hungarian mothers are equally entitled to it regardless of their nationality or ethnic origin.

In the following paragraph the author notes: "The efforts aiming at the assimilation of the gypsies envisage the total abolition of their colonies." The elimination of such colonies would be very desirable in fact, but many people, among them this writer, do not agree with the forced dispersion of their inhabitants. The first sentence is fundamentally wrong. For the winding up of the colonies does not imply a drive toward assimilation; its purpose is to grant more humane living conditions to the gypsies. And insofar as the author's protest against the forced dispersion of the gypsies is concerned, I fully agree with him, and if he were a little bit informed about the situation, he would have no reason to protest since dispersion of the colonies is not the general rule. On the contrary, many gypsies complain that after leaving the colony behind they still find themselves living on "gypsy row" while, as they say, they want to live in the street "of the Hungarians." Now the question is, are those in the majority who want to remain together, or those who want to live separately? In contrast with the author of the article I would not dare to insist on any of these two alternatives since a national poll concerning the opinion of the interested never took place. According to experience, the gypsies are divided among themselves on this problem, each colony and each family having another yearning. Yet I think the crux of the matter is not that when a colony is dissolved its inhabitants should be resettled together or separately but that the pertinent decision should not be made without hearing them and without taking into consideration their opinion within the limits of the possibilities. On the other hand I agree that "we should give a chance of a more meaningful way of life to the entire ethnic group." The pertinent government decisions are aiming at this.

The decrees issued by the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development in connection with the liquidation of the gypsy colonies have already been greatly amended, and fortunately the village councils have eliminated these colonies not only at the "most visible spots" but also in the majority of the small and remote villages. Moreover, not only have the gypsies benefited from particular advantageous credits, which besides have been granted also to other people living under similar circumstances, but many of them got flood relief loans, obtained apartments in workers' and miners' housing projects or moved into houses built by themselves or into apartments rented from the local councils. Thus at present, instead of the 80,000 or 100,000 gypsies living in colonies, as Andras B. Balint writes it, there are only 45,000 left in them. Of course I would prefer to report that we have abolished the gypsy colonies altogether. However, it is not true that half of the colonies still exist. According to reports by the local councils, the ratio of gypsies who are still living in colonies is around 13 to 14 percent.

Insofar as the social stratification of the gypsies is concerned, which is described by the "Gypsy Story" attached to the article, and which claims that gypsies are "usually" divided, according to their degree of integration, into

integrated, integrating and migrating categories, this division is obsolete and completely distorts the real picture. For one thing integration is a much more complex process, which can be examined from various angles, than something which can be measured on the basis of the individual gypsies income and housing status. On the other hand, no matter where the author found the source of his information that 30-40,000 gypsies are still migrating in Hungary from village to village and from county to county, it is not true. Such a phenomenon could most probably not escape the attention of either the population or the local councils. The migrating way of life of the gypsies belongs to the past.

Moreover, there are plenty of statements in the article which are inspired by prejudice and are likely to perpetuate it. Thus I do not understand, for example, the author's hypothesis that gypsies living in colonies are much greater consumers of alcoholic drinks than the rest of the population. A survey that could prove that was never made. By the way, lousy and scabby families are not the general rule in the colonies and such people can be found also elsewhere.

"We cannot accept the assumption that they are inferior human beings." In 1983 it is no longer admissible to put such a caption on the picture of a gypsy child. We should have left behind such negative statements for decades and they cannot be uttered in this form. And who would want to cite criminal statistics when writing about the working class or about any national minority? As long as such biased publications are "defending" the gypsies, it is no wonder that the prejudices about gypsy in public opinion are kept alive. The documentation of the causes of racial discrimination is unworthy of us; these things do not need to be interpreted.

At the same time there is not a single line in the article about the changes that occurred in the conditions of life of the gypsies over the last 20 years. Thus it is no wonder that in the author's assessment the government measures concerning them did not live up to the expectations. In this connection, beyond the changes in the employment and housing of the gypsies I would like to call attention to other facts. Thus while 10 years ago there were hardly any gypsy children in the kindergartens, now as a result of our efforts during recent years, 50-60 percent, i.e. 15,000, of the gypsy children are going to these primary institutions of education. While in 1970 only 15 percent of the gypsy pupils who entered the elementary schools 8 years earlier reached eighth grade, now about 60 percent will graduate within the legal school age. Moreover, I think it is interesting to note that over the last couple of years 4-5,000 gypsies have entered annually into the high schools, approximately 1,000 gypsies are yearly acquiring skilled-worker certificates and the number of university and college graduate gypsies has been growing, albeit still slowly. I emphasize these facts only because the unfavorable chances of the gypsies to get good jobs, which the author of the article rightly points out, are expected to change as a result of their improving education and skills.

We may say in general that the prejudices of the population will not change as long as the authors of such articles, instead of drawing their information from gypsies who are involved in this area of topics or from scholars who have a grasp of these problems, are relying on their scant knowledge of the facts and using individual case studies or obsolete writings, are indulging in inadmissible generalizations or are even echoing the opinions of false informants who try to mislead public opinion.

Finally it is a fact that the "gypsy problem" is a social problem and not just a problem of social policy. Anyone who would deny this would only disclose thereby his ignorance about the situation. However it is also a fact that we could have made greater progress in promoting the cultural values of the gypsies and particularly in purifying the gypsy language if the competent authorities had at least observed the spirit of the pertinent government decisions. And if the educators would take into consideration the handicaps of the bilingual gypsy pupils, then there would probably be fewer gypsy children sent to auxiliary schools, failing at the year-end examinations and compelled to repeat classes. This should not hinge on whether gypsies are a nationality.

And insofar as the membership of the Interdepartmental Coordination Committee is concerned, which is mentioned in the "Gypsy Story," this committee is called interdepartmental because the competent ministries are represented in it, who among other things are to implement, each of them in its own area of competence, the decisions bent upon improving the situation of the gypsies. Concurrently, in order to broaden the representation of the gypsies' interests, delegates of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the Central Committee of KISZ [Communist Youth Federation], the Patriotic People's Front, the Red Cross, the National Council of Trade Unions and last but not least the gypsies themselves are attending sessions of this committee.

Tact and Determination

Comments by Lajos Floris

In fact, some wording in your article elicits reactions and even emotions, apparently from me too. It looks like a domestic, albeit by no means noble, tradition that we have to regard delicate questions only through extremist, i.e. optimistic or pessimistic optics. The official and in general the printed opinions are imbued with humanism, though often a fake humanism, while in private conversations we frequently hear fascistoid opinions of racial hatred. Meanwhile the "so-called gypsy problem" exists, grows the becomes ever more onerous. In fact it is not at all a hypothetical problem.

I think the problem can be best made palpable by a somewhat far-fetched example, although I know that the figures I shall cite are arbitrary since exact data are not available. The problem may be presented so: if we are able to integrate to some extent 3,000 gypsies yearly in our society, but meanwhile the gypsy population grows by 6,000 per year, when will the gypsy problem be solved? The answer is never. Now I would not go into details of whether we understand by integration assimilation or development while conserving their own identity. By all means we mean jobs, civilized environment, education and the like. And let us also overlook the fact that this cannot be accomplished within a year but entails a process of development over decades. But let us suppose that the aforementioned proportion of them reaches a more or less definable level of integration. The crux of the problem is that in this way the gypsy question tends to grow worse rather than move toward a solution. All this seems to indicate that the handling of the problem was not rightly envisaged and the means for its solution have not been correctly chosen.

In many respects this professional and undoubtedly well-meaning article blames much more the negative value judgment and intolerance of "society" than the slow adaptation and development of the gypsies, which to some extent is understandable and natural but should nevertheless change, or even their rejection of progress. The article makes the majority accountable for its "negation of the gypsies' right to represent their own interests and to realize where their interests lie." In other words the majority is responsible for the fact that the gypsies allegedly are not yet aware of their own interests. My experience shows rather the opposite: gypsies are raising, often collectively and not infrequently aggressively, in defense of their own, let us admit not always justified, interests.

Yes, help is needed from the majority. It should be a well-meaning and charitable help that recognizes the beneficiary's human and cultural values. But help alone is not enough. It should be coupled with, and in many cases it really is, good will to accept it and when this is not the case, strength should be combined with the helping hand. We cannot leave everything to the chance of a more or less spontaneous development. We have to assist the gypsies in all their positive efforts, be these tending toward integration or development toward nationhood. It is their business collectively and of each of them individually to choose their road. What is essential is that we should not promote trends which tend to reproduce the gypsy problem.

Another article in the HETI VILAGGASDASAG series "Gypsy Story" shows that there are such erroneous views nourished by false humanism or what-not both in officialdom and in literature. I cite a phrase from it: "without denying their right to migrate." I deny it is indeed their right to migrate since migration contrasts with our laws and way of life. No one can conduct a nomadic life without violating policing, hygienic and educational statutes as well as land and garden ownership rights. We cannot exempt part of our population, which is probably still growing, from the observation of our laws, not even in cases when their implementation is at odds with millennia-old traditions.

No matter how difficult it is, for it is really difficult, we should find ways and means to avoid such social benefits as the family allowance and the child-care allowance becoming either the financial basis of an idle and lumpen way of life or an incentive for a socially undesirable population growth. One thing is that we consider us responsible for each human life which comes to this world, and another matter is to encourage and quasi-reward the birth of the six or eight-child of families in which the future, life and health of the already existing children points unmistakably to the fact that further progeniture would only swell the number of our problem youths.

It would be very important to make progress in these matters which have great significance for our entire society, including the gypsies. This would require that we hear not only from those who in their studies of institutions or in a villa with garden are working out solutions for the gypsy problem on the basis of theories which have never been tested. We should also cull the opinion of those who draw their conclusions from real life, i.e. the representatives of the gypsies as well as officials of the local councils, educators and medical doctors. And we should act with tact, energy and the proper financial means.

Wrong Habits

Comments by Mrs. Istvan Kiss, secretary of the Coordination Committee of Heves County Council

The editorial board of your paper predicted that Andras B. Balint's article will elicit the most variable reaction from your readers. Indeed, not only the article but also the first sentence of the introduction provokes discussion. I do not share the author's opinion that "the available data concerning the employment of the gypsies are quite inaccurate." As a matter of fact, we have very accurate and fresh data concerning this topic. If somebody does not know them, it does not mean that they do not exist. It is even less understandable that according to the author a cause and effect relationship exists between this inaccuracy and murkiness and the national identity of the gypsies.

In Heves County, where I have been studying since 1977 the situation of the gypsy population, there are 17,950 gypsies, that is, 5 percent of the population in contrast with the national average of 3 percent. Eighty-four percent of the gypsies live in villages.

I would not deny the author's good will and his intention to advocate the gypsies' interests. This appears to be evident from his various remarks. Strangely enough, I see its dangerousness precisely in the fact that openminded readers who are exempt from prejudices but are not knowledgeable in these topics may ingenuously take every word of an article of such a tone as the plain truth. They may think: finally somebody who does not offend the gypsies; his data and arguments are certainly reliable. As I see it, the trouble is that the author used the wrong sources and adopted uncritically data which were already obsolete when they were published (or simply did not correspond to the truth).

By the way it is dangerous to use 10 or 20 year old sources concerning the gypsies since over the last decades the changes in their life, among other things in their employment, have been so relevant that it is illicit to ignore them.

Articles in the Hungarian press which deal with the gypsies' situation are characterized by a trend of neglecting the most recent data and of relying on earlier writings which are believed to have the truth. We have almost reached the point where not only the usual stereotypes concerning gypsies are absorbed by our consciousness but also the stereotypes brought about by the wrong articles. We are now witnessing a real chain reaction. If anybody will use this article in a few years as a source, he will contribute to the survival of inaccurate data and the wrong conclusions flowing from them.

The author's statement that "in the early 1960's the number of gypsies was estimated as being 200,000, while in 1971 a survey of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences mentions the figure of 310,000 or 320,000, and gives the reader the impression that their number grew in 10 years from 200,000 to 320,000. The researchers or the persons who consider themselves such add yearly 20-30,000 to the gypsy population, thinking that they hit upon the truth. The number of Hungarian gypsies will only then bypass 500,000 by the end of this millenium if their birth rate does not decline, if all gypsy babies survive and if none of

them dies by 2000. In fact their birth rate has demonstrably declined during the last couple of years, child mortality among gypsies is one and a half times greater and their life expectancy 10 years lower than the national average. Only five to six percent of them reach retirement age. Those who write such prognostics do not realize the close interrelation between the objective conditions of people's life and the demographic indices. They do not notice that in industrial settlements, where mothers have been working regularly over the last 8 or 10 years, gypsy families tend to have one or two children. Favorable changes are also perceptible among the elementary school pupils. In many countries we observe the decline in the relative number of gypsy pupils. The small increase in the absolute number of them is not the result of their growth in the first grade but is due to the increase in the number of those who are reaching higher grades (and it is also a consequence of accounting those who have remained in school because they have to repeat a school year). The fact that each gypsy student stays in school generally more than 8 years is a statistical "component" in the number of them.

It is hardly a safe approach to the census of the gypsies to take the record of the enterprises and state offices into account. These are probably not keeping such records of their employees. On the other hand, in contrast with the assumption made by the article, the county councils which are using the data of the local councils possess accurate and detailed statistics concerning the employment of both men and women--and not only about employment--divided according to areas and occupations. The village councils know each family and each individual and have been preparing their statistical reports over the last 6 years on this basis. The errors in these reports are not greater than those of statistical services in general. It never happens that they would record occasional jobs over a few days as regular work. Conversely, they may register occasional workers as unemployed, showing thereby that public opinion does not hold occasional jobs in high esteem. Occasional work done by gypsies means usually several 10-hour working days during the harvest season in agriculture rather than casual labor over a few days. Nowadays it frequently happens that gypsies employed in factories are using their annual leave in order to participate in the harvest.

The article underestimated the rate of employment. In Heves County 92.3 percent of the able-bodied men at working age are employed, 80.3 percent of them in permanent and 12 percent in casual jobs.

And on what basis does the author write that "a significant part of the families makes its living, aside from the men's occasional jobs, from family allowance and child-care benefits in case of families with various children." Did the author notice that only those who from 25 possible work days in a month have worked at least 21 days are entitled to receive family allowance? And that the condition for receiving child-care benefits is that the woman in question had been employed before? Thus many are not entitled to receive such benefits and they cannot become a source of livelihood for them.

In contrast with the article, I would not say that the "government measures concerning the gypsies did not live up to expectations." For one thing, the pertinent process is not yet so advanced that anyone may consider it definite.

On the other hand, the impact of the measures cannot be determined on the basis of trends in the public opinion, i.e. the behavior--antipathy or sympathy--of the non-gypsies. These show only that beliefs are slower to change than life itself.

I consider it progress, for example, that while in the early 1970's there were hardly any gypsy children in the kindergartens, in 1976 already 24 percent and now 68 percent of them are included in this type of education. These children will enter schools within a few years and the impact of their kindergarten experience will only be perceptible after years on the basis of their performance in schools, in their compliance with compulsory education and in the changes in the thought and behavior of the upcoming adult generations. Beyond the mentioned employment indices I have to mention that in addition to the 3 cities of our county in 37 villages 100 percent of the able-bodied men of working age are employed. (In 1978 we had only 24 such villages.) In the other 33 villages from their gypsy population of 115 men, only 5 do not have an occupation which will provide their livelihood. The number of students in high schools grows from year to year. Their choice of professions has become broader. As a result of this, they will find employment, within a few years, in occupations from which they were absent so far, for example, health care, food industry, commerce and catering industry. We find now 44 gypsy children in the Heves County vocational training schools. The establishment of gypsy student groups is only in such cases justified when we could provide them a greater possibility of catching up with their non-gypsy counterparts. Nowadays the creation of separate gypsy student groups can no longer be justified by our need of getting rid of intractable children. Besides there is no gypsy-speaking child in our county. A result of the government's "gypsy policy" and its consequential implementation is that while in 1979 only 10 percent of the gypsy children were in day nursery, now 38 percent are using these facilities.

The "Gypsy Story" part of the article preserves best the 20 year old customary tripartite division of the gypsies. Apparently we cannot get rid of this cliché although already 20 years ago it was only acceptable if by comparison we were satisfied with the division of the elements into metallic, nonmetallic and amphoteric categories. The estimated number of migrating gypsies is unrealistic as is the number of those who speak the gypsy language. Inasmuch as the latter are concerned, a survey of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences found that only 29 percent of them have this ability. With the passing away of the older generations this proportion must have further decreased. Of course this does not mean that we should not take care of the gypsy-speaking people and of their linguistic culture in those counties in which they are numerous.

Gypsies, School Relationship

Budapest KOZNEVELES in Hungarian 18 Mar 83 pp 26

/Article by Gyongyi Racz/

/Text/ A fruitful relationship between gypsy families and schools hinges in the first place on the educators' care about the gypsy children and their professional consciousness.

The contents, methods and forms of this relationship are determined in the beginning of the gypsy children's life in school by the fact that most of them did not attend kindergarten or were only briefly exposed to this kind of education. This is in part the cause of why the first school year has such a decisive impact upon the relations between the gypsy family and the school.

For our educators in charge of gypsy children the greatest problem is cooperation with the family. The formation of regular contacts between teacher and family does not depend only on the educator's good will to cooperate and his ability to organize, since unilateral wishes are of no avail. If the educator cannot obtain the cooperation of the family and has to go ahead alone in his efforts to form the child's personality, his methods will not achieve the desired results. The educator has to seek contacts with the family with the purpose of clarifying the contributions of both family and school to the proper behavior and attitude of the child.

If the teacher wants to loosen the self-imposed seclusion of the gypsy family and make school education more effective, he must be aware of the social position, conditions of existence of the gypsy families and the trends in the upbringing of their children.

Gypsies constitute in our society a differentiated and generally handicapped ethnic group. Social development has transformed their conditions of life, changed the way of life of the gypsy families and influenced their mutual relations and the way they bring up their children.

Nevertheless the essential differences between the family breeding of gypsy and non-gypsy children are still obvious.

Seventy-eight percent of the gypsies are living in villages. Their housing conditions have improved significantly over the last 20 years, at present only 12 percent of them are living in gypsy settlements. Their male population may be considered as fully employed and 50 percent of the women are also wage earners. Twenty percent of the gypsy workers are skilled and trained laborers. In small settlements, however, the problem of unskilled adults and 16-18 year old youths at the threshold of working age is unresolved. Thus most of them are commuting or living in workers quarters. When the head of the family is commuting, the mother with various children cannot undertake a distant job since there are not enough child-care facilities in the villages, and if there are any, they are too expensive for them. Research on a national level demonstrates that the per capita income of such gypsy families is around 700 to 1,000 forints monthly, i.e. 27 to 33 forints per day. This is hardly enough for the basic daily needs, and therefore their sense of defenselessness is permanent. This is one of the factors which influence parent-school relations since clothing the children and buying them the necessary school equipment present almost insoluble problems to the gypsies.

Social benefits channeled through the schools and decreases in the day-nursery fees have been devised to make the situation more tolerable.

Yet these can only be conceived as temporary measures, and a real solution of the problem entails the bringing up of the conditions of life and financial status of the gypsy families to the standard of the average Hungarian family with children.

The above-mentioned conditions of life of the gypsies are defining the value system of their families and the orientation of their children. The situation and status of the gypsy children within their family differ in many respects from those of the average non-gypsy child. The state of mind and pattern of needs of the gypsy child are defined by the fact that he has to participate in the struggle for his basic livelihood. The importance and usefulness of the child's work in the gypsy family is obvious and he is appreciated accordingly. All these things are often ignored by the educator and exceed the limits of his possibility to assess the child. As a consequence of their feeling of interdependence, children of large families have strong ties to the family and consider it a great punishment if they have to stay out from family activities. Their hard conditions of life develop in them other kinds of abilities and they are more mature and more familiar with real life than non-gypsies. It is characteristic of them and it is a natural consequence of their low standard of living that they hardly possess any personal objects and toys and therefore the border areas between the "mine" and the "ours" are murky and imperceptible in their eyes.

The close relations and bodily contacts within the gypsy family and the children's orientation toward sign-speech also determine their relations with teachers and pals. When they enter the school, they realize that all the activities they have been trained in, which represent a value for them and constitute an indispensable part of their life, have become useless and valueless. They arrive with something in their bag that they want to show to their schoolmates and share with them. In our effectively working schools teachers pay attention to the gypsy children's love for nature and music, their manual skill and love for telling tales and make use of their abilities.

In the life of gypsy children facial expressions, touching (caressing), word of mouth and the tone of voice have special significance. Thus they will accept indiscriminately and will consider as a judgment everything that their educators or schoolmates say about them. This credulity enhances their inferiority complex, their inhibitions and fears. Their sense of defenselessness intensifies because despite their attempts their schoolmates do not adopt them into their community. Thus during their schooltime they lack motivation for identifying themselves with their schoolmates and thus they regard the school customs and regulations as unnecessary and compliance with them as abnormal. Their integration is made difficult by their classmates who turn a cold shoulder on them and mock them, and ultimately both sides keep their own inherited prejudices.

The gypsy children's disposition toward school is influenced also by their parents' lack of schooling or their positive or negative attitude toward school. The parents' relations with school are determined by their past experience with it, i.e. whether they were successful and whether their school grade was helpful for them in their life.

When planning the establishment of relations with gypsy children, teachers should keep in mind that gypsy parents often cannot render help to their children in their studies but they can motivate them and that the parents' relations with school hinge on their children's achievements in it and on their mood when coming home. The teacher's approach to the gypsy family will be much easier if he not only reprimands their little child but also caresses and praises him in school. Thus the first time in her life, the gypsy mother will come across the fact that her child feels herself safe outside the family. Her confidence in the educator will be stronger if she realizes that her child's knowledge grows and his skills become more perfect and if she is aware of the fact that the teacher continuously takes care of her child. The parents' information about school is provided and their opinion about the teachers is motivated in the first place by their children. This connection may lay the ground for their approach to school, may motivate them to attend the P.T.A. meeting or visit their children's educator, follow his advise and take to heart his warnings.

Thus the teacher can enhance the gypsy parents' confidence in school by relying on the mother's love for her children.

He can then strengthen the relationship between school and parents with little steps, by making the acquaintance of his gypsy pupil's family and moving closer to it with sympathy.

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SPECIAL INTEREST PERIODICAL AUDIENCE, DISTRIBUTION LIMITED

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 24 May 83 p 6

[Article by Miklos Zelei: "In the Workshop of UJ FORRAS: If We Do Not Administer Ourselves...."]

[Text] The cultural, literary and artistic journal UJ FORRAS [New Source] appears in Tatabanya a total of 6 times per year, in 1,500 copies. Without doubt UJ FORRAS wrote its name into Hungarian journalistic history with the debate about national consciousness conducted a few years ago. Interest really was great, but I dare not say that the journal is known by the so-called broader reading public. Like others similar to it this journal is present only in a unique professional medium of our national intellectual life. The large mass communication media--naturally including television--have been for years essentially averse to passing on to the large public the spirit represented by central journals appearing in the provinces, the values create in them. Without them, however, one can get only a distorted picture of contemporary Hungarian culture.

So the first think I asked Istvan Payer, editor-in-chief of UJ FORRAS, Imre Monostori, his deputy, and Laszlo Gyori, one of the workers on the paper, was about the uneven chances--as I have done several times already in our series on journals appearing in the provinces.

"What would be most important is criticism, a response," Imre Monostori said. "We get practically useless feedback from the megye paper, and hardly any opinion comes from elsewhere, from the national forums. So we were happy when we learned of the initiative of the Writers' Federation, that it was going to evaluate the journals. This has been done already for TISZATAJ and MOZGO VILAG. If this activity really becomes a continuing one it could become an important background for editorial work. I feel that, for example, the television cultural progress Studio '83 might take part in our work also by calling attention to some issue of our journal, but it does not. Why should it? But we are already a little tired of managing ourselves--which, of course, can be done only within the limits of good taste. But if we did not administer ourselves we might suffocate. I went out here, in Tatabanya, to a post office; I could not buy a copy of our journal; they did not even know it existed. The vendors in Pest frequently do not put out UJ FORRAS.... It has even happened that post packages return unopened. But I know that if the editors were to organize the sales the post office might bring them to trial, because distribution is their monopoly."

"UJ FORRAS goes into its 15th year this year," Laszlo Gyori took over, "but because of what has been said, and perhaps because of the age of its authors, it is known primarily only among a narrow circle of young literati and intellectuals, 30 to 40 years old. The most significant event in its history really was the nation debate; this recruited new readers and follower.... Of course, more important than this was the fact that the paper created something of value with the debate. I am sure that the lessons of this encounter were inevitable."

"What effect did the debate have on the internal life of UJ FORRAS, on forging it together?" I asked Laszlo Gyori.

"When the debate was going on I still lived in Tatabanya; since then I have moved to Budapest. I well remember those exciting months, when more and more contributions arrived one after another. We read them feverishly. We on the staff debated with the authors and with one another. All this represents a great experience for a small editorial staff, represents a cohesive force. We felt that we were putting out a worth while journal. We were justified after the fact when LATOHATAR published long excerpts from the debate. Of course, one must always struggle for subsequent vindication. I recently re-read a few articles. They are just as fresh, radiating ideas and passions. Their chief virtue is that they encourage thought and reflection. It is unfortunate that most of the participants were 30-40 year old literary people, ethnographers and sociologist and not historians; because from a certain viewpoint, perhaps, the credibility of the debate may have been less, less exact, the approach a little essayistic, but certainly more exciting and more stimulating. Now the various experts can follow up on it."

"How was the profile of the journal formed?"

"It is difficult to find a real profile," Istvan Payer said. "It appears, with some exaggeration, that a journal gets organized around every more important sphere of problems. But one should approach the problem of the many journals by nothing also that they come out in extraordinarily few copies. As has been noted many times, all the provincial journals together do not reach the number of copies of journals appearing in the capital."

"There would really be a need for so many journals," Imre Monostori said, "if they could be organized according to trends. And by trend I do not mean exclusiveness, rejecting other values."

"We can keep up in this great troop of journals," Istvan Payer continued, "we can produce quality, if we pay. The sum available for honoraria obviously does not make this possible. Most recently the megye council gave scholarships to a few of our authors for a sociographic series in which they described the megye—we hoped in such a way that it would be interesting to readers living in other parts of the country and to various experts of other megyes. Soon, perhaps, we will try to get money from the mines."

MINISTER OUTLINES OFFICIAL POLICY ON RELIGION

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 4, Apr 83 pp 15-25

[Article by Adam Lopatka, minister, head of Office of Religious Affairs: "The Principles of the Polish People's Republic's Policy on Religion"]

[Text] The Polish People's Republic's policy on religion has been a subject of numerous studies and scientific works, expressions of opinion by statesmen and journalists, as well as a subject of exchange of views at meetings or conversations in a family circle. Here I wish to draw attention only to some aspects of this policy, namely, what are the realities of this policy, what values it helps attain, and what are the state's objectives in this area.

Realities

At present, 34 churches or religious associations are operating legally in Poland.

The religious needs of the citizens of the Polish People's Republic are met most fully by the Roman Catholic Church. Proof of the position and significance of this can be furnished, at least, by the following statistical data, compiled at the end of 1981: 21,059 priests, including 5,117 monastic priests; 85 bishops and archbishops; 9,603 monks (including monastic priests), and 27,429 nuns. They are active within the framework of 7,299 parishes, 27 dioceses, 45 men's monastic orders and monastic associations, and 104 women's monastic orders and monastic associations. Religious services are held in 14,660 churches and chapels. New cadres of clergymen are being educated in 46 seminaries, whose total enrollment in the 1981-1982 school year was 7,225 students. Church institutions of higher education as well as the State Academy of Catholic Theology are also active. Catholic Church press totaled 60 titles with a combined daily circulation of 1,825,951 copies. Since September 1980, Polish Radio has broadcast mass every Sunday. Also, a mass for sailors is broadcast separately. On the other hand, the exact number of Catholic believers is not known. Some persons who were baptized have ceased to believe or have changed their religion. However, there is no doubt that the majority of the citizens of the Polish People's Republic are of Catholic faith.

Eight Christian churches are represented in the Polish Ecumenical Council. Their position is illustrated by the following data, compiled at the end of

1981. The Polish Autonomous Orthodox Church has 320 clergymen including 4 bishops; it has 233 parishes and the use of 301 Russian Orthodox churches. It totals about 480,000 believers. The Augsburg Protestant Church in the Polish People's Republic has 92 clergymen including 1 bishop; it has 122 chapels 352 churches and prayerhouses. It totals about 72,000 believers. The Protestant Reformed Church in the Polish People's Republic has 4 clergymen including 1 bishop; it has 8 chapels, 13 prayerhouses, and totals approximately 4,500 believers. The Methodist Church in the Polish People's Republic has 36 clergymen, 60 chapels, 56 prayerhouses, and about 4,000 believers. The Polish [National] Catholic Church in the Polish People's Republic has 116 clergymen including 3 bishops; it has 88 parishes, 93 churches, and totals approximately 30,000 believers. The Old Catholic Mariavite Church in the Polish People's Republic has 29 clergymen including 1 bishop; it has 42 parishes, 55 churches, and totals approximately 25,000 believers. The Polish Christian Baptist Church has 60 clergymen, 128 chapels, 56 prayerhouses, and it totals approximately 6,000 believers. The United Evangelical Church in the Polish People's Republic has 256 clergymen, 124 chapels, 79 prayerhouses, and it totals approximately 10,000 believers.

Of all the churches and religious associations which do not belong to the Polish Ecumenical Council, the Church of Seventh-Day Adventists in the Polish People's Republic has the greatest number of believers. There are approximately 7,000 of them. In addition, it has 64 clergymen, 118 chapels and 118 prayerhouses. There is no need to mention by name other churches and religious associations which are active in Poland. I will limit myself to mentioning only some of them. Thus, there is the Catholic Mariavite Church in the Polish People's Republic (approximately 3,600 believers), the Church of Christ in the Polish People's Republic (approximately 3,000 believers), the "Epifania" Lay Missionary Movement (approximately 2,000 believers), the Church of Free Christians in the Polish People's Republic (approximately 2,000 believers), and the Association of Free Bible Scientists (approximately 2,000 believers).

It is worth adding that also non-Christian religious associations, such as the Moslem Religious Association (approximately 2,100 believers), the Jewish Faith Religious Association in the Polish People's Republic (approximately 2,000 believers), or two Buddhist associations, are active in Poland.

All the non-Roman Catholic churches and religious associations represent in Poland an insignificant percentage of believers. They total approximately 1,900 clergymen and lay preachers, as well as 1,311 organizational units and 1,381 churches and prayerhouses; their total membership is approximately 660,000.

Non-Roman Catholic religions have also their own press, totaling 21 [periodical] titles, with a combined daily circulation of 84,800 copies. Polish Radio broadcasts, upon requests of 14 churches or religious associations, their religious services on occasions of days or holidays which are of particular importance for a certain religion.

A quantitative assessment of churches and religious associations is important for the state's policy on religion. However, it is not sufficient. The

qualitative aspect is just as important. Namely, it is important to know what social values have been and continue to be contributed to our society's life and our national culture by individual religious associations. There is no need to argue that the Roman Catholic Church has made and continues to make a large contribution to Polish national culture and that it has had and continues to have a great impact on our society's mentality. But the contributions of other churches and religious associations are also significant in this respect; this applies particularly to Russian Orthodox religion, Protestant churches, Jewish religion, Moslem religion, and some others.

Last but not least, the state has an obligation to note and value also the international aspect of the activity of churches and religious associations.

It is evident that in this respect of greatest importance are the relations between the Polish People's Republic and the Apostolic See, as well as the relations of the Catholic Church in Poland with the Catholic Church in other countries. The status of the relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church in Poland is also of importance for the relations of the Polish People's Republic with countries in which this religion is also dominant.

But, also, the status of the relations between the state and other churches and religious associations is of great importance for the relations between the Polish People's Republic and countries in which a certain church or religious association plays an important role. Suffice it to draw attention to the fact that in the world there are many countries with which Poland cooperates and in which the Moslem religion is dominant. A similar statement could be made about the importance of relations with Protestant churches for cooperation with countries in which these churches have a greater influence than in Poland.

We should add that some churches play an important part in international politics, and participate actively in the work of the UN and many other international organizations including also regional organizations.

The realities of the international situation always call for considering at least three aspects: numerical, qualitative, and international.

Values

Policy on religion is a part of the overall policy of the Polish People's Republic. The same values to whose attainment and cultivation our entire government policy is subordinated are important to policy on religion. Moreover, there exist close interdependencies between areas and fields of government policy, including also policy on religion, and other fields of government policy.

Values which govern policy on religion are expressed in the constitution of the Polish People's Republic. The supreme value is the good of the Polish nation, as well as this nation's sovereignty, independence, and security.

This good is best served by strengthening the socialist state, which is the fundamental force that assures the nation's progress.

Acceleration of Poland's political, economic, and cultural development occupies a prominent place in the hierarchy of values which the policies of the Polish People's Republic are to attain.

An essential value that is being implemented by the policies of the Polish People's Republic, including also policy on religion, is enhancement of patriotic feelings as well as the nation's unity and solidarity in a struggle for steady betterment of social conditions, complete elimination of a man's exploitation by another man, achievement of social justice, and full development of every citizen's personality.

Tightening the links of friendship among nations that are forged by alliance and brotherhood, as well as solidarity with forces of progress, strengthening the bonds of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations, is a successive value whose implementation is served by the overall policy of the Polish People's Republic.

Consolidation of peace, prevention of aggression, constructive contribution to the life of the international community, represent high values which the policies of the Polish People's Republic are trying to attain.

Consolidation of people's power, development of socialist democracy, strengthening of legality, implementation of human rights and basic freedoms, are also values which are served by the policies of the Polish People's Republic.

Consolidation, protection, and development of the social ownership of means of production, just like strengthening of the leading role of the PZPR in the building of socialism, are values which are to be implemented by the policies of the Polish People's Republic. These are instrumental values which help in the implementation of other, above-mentioned values; on the other hand, these are also independent values.

Moreover, there are certain values which are important only to policy on religion. However, they can be correctly implemented only if we take into account those values whose implementation is to be aided by the overall policy of our state. Such a value, above all, is freedom of thought, conscience, religion and convictions, according to a person's choice.

Freedom to have, choose, and change religious or other convictions cannot be and is not subject to any restrictions.

However, freedom to express outwardly one's convictions or religion is already subject to certain restrictions. The international document on civil and political rights, one of whose signatories is Poland, provides for writing such restrictions into law, with the stipulation that they should be only of the kind that is necessary to preserve public safety and order, public health, morality, or laws, and the basic freedoms of other people. Thus, it is not an

absolute value, although it occupies a prominent place in the hierarchy of values.

Objectives

The objectives which are to be gradually attained through the Polish People's Republic's policy on religion are real, i.e., attainable. When setting up these objectives, the state takes into consideration the total reality of our country, including also religious matters. At the same time, the state is concerned about long-range objectives and not about immediate or partial objectives; it is concerned more with strategic than with tactical objectives.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, we can assert that the Polish People's Republic's policy on religion strives to attain three main objectives. These are: full observance by everyone of the principles of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic which apply to religion, churches and religious associations; elimination of instances of antisocialist and antistate involvement of clergy as well as lay citizens, when this involvement is related to religion; attainment of a status of normalcy in relations between the state and the churches and religious associations.

The above-mentioned principles of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic were established in 1952, and, since then, except for the elimination in 1976 of paragraph 3 in former article 70 (at present, article 82) which mentioned the possibility of punishment for abusing freedom of religion for aims which would harm the interests of the Polish People's Republic, no changes have been made in them. Nor have they, in principle, evoked any objections from persons whom they concern. However, all kinds of difficulties and restrictions have affected their day-to-day implementation, and continue to do so at present. Implementation of these principles has always taken place in a historical context, the latter having influenced their very interpretation as well as our assessment of the extent to which they are being implemented.

I shall mention those principles of our constitution which are pertinent to this matter.

First of all, there is the principle of the equality of rights and duties of citizens of the Polish People's Republic regardless of their religion and convictions. This principle is expressed in article 67, paragraph 2, and in articles 81 and 95. Article 81 of our constitution specifies that citizens of the Polish People's Republic have equal rights, regardless of, among other things, their religion, in all areas of our government as well as political, economic, social and cultural life. Infringement of this principle through any kind of direct or indirect discrimination or through curtailment of rights because of one's religion is punishable in the Polish People's Republic. Likewise, it is prohibited to spread hate or contempt, to provoke quarrels or to humiliate a person because of religious differences.

We should assert that practical implementation of this principle at present does meet with any serious difficulties. Some discrimination in favor of

clergy in some matters does not produce any serious reservations on the part of public opinion. There are reasons to anticipate that also in the future there will be no serious problems with the implementation of this principle.

The principle of freedom of conscience and religion is established in article 82 of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic. This principle signifies, as specified in article 18 of the already mentioned document on civil and political rights, freedom to have or accept religion or convictions in accordance with one's choice. It also signifies freedom to express outwardly one's religion or convictions, both individually and together with others, both publicly and privately. This outward expression may be in the form of prayers or services, practice, and teaching. The constitution of the Polish People's Republic prohibits forcing citizens not to participate in religious activities or ceremonies. Likewise, nobody may be forced to participate in any religious activities or ceremonies. I already have mentioned the necessary restrictions on freedom to express outwardly one's religion or convictions.

At present, all authorities in Poland respect freedom to express outwardly one's religion or convictions. We have attained a high level of tolerance in this area. Nevertheless, there are still instances of exerting various kinds of pressure on nonbelievers, and on children who do not participate in religious instruction or in some religious ceremonies in conformity with the wishes of their parents or guardians. Moreover, we have sometimes noted instances of intolerance of believers of one religion toward believers of another religion. In such cases, the state initiates appropriate measures in order to guarantee to all citizens the freedom to express outwardly their religion or conviction within the limits of existing laws. The state acts as a guardian of this freedom. The state cannot be lenient toward those who do not want to respect the feelings and convictions of others.

There are reasons to anticipate that in the future this freedom will be guaranteed even more fully.

Article 82 of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic states that churches and religious associations can freely perform their religious functions. Churches and religious associations in Poland take advantage of this principle fully and without restraint. The state takes no interest in the context and form of religious ceremonies that take place in churches, chapels, prayerhouses, as well as in the immediate vicinity of churches and in cemeteries. Likewise, the state takes no interest in outward expressions of religion or convictions which take place in private apartments. The state often allows traditional religious ceremonies to be held outside a church and its immediate vicinity, as well as in cemeteries. The state intends to continue this practice also in the future, even though these ceremonies at times seriously interfere with the daily activities of those citizens who do not take part in the former.

However, sometimes there are attempts to abuse the above-mentioned principle; these attempts are initiated or tolerated particularly by some Catholic clergymen. There have been instances of organizing in churches, on the pretext of a religious ceremony, manifestations or activities, e.g., lectures on

political topics, artistic activities, etc. of an antigovernment and political nature, directed against the state and against legal order. Another way in which this principle is abused is the organization--without an appropriate permission--of various nontraditional religious ceremonies and manifestations outside churches and their immediate vicinity, as well as in cemeteries.

At times, too, there are attempts by some clergymen or groups of believers to take advantage of this freedom not merely for the implementation of religious functions but also of other functions which are arrogated by some churches and particularly by the Catholic Church, e.g., for the implementation of charitable or instructional functions and, at times, simply of functions which have nothing in common with religion. There is an essential difference between unconstrained practice of religious functions and political clericalism.

In the interests of freedom to perform religious functions, interested churches and religious associations should make sure, to a greater extent than is the case at present, that this freedom is not abused in one way or another for aims which are contrary to the interests of the nation and the state. In these efforts, they will have the necessary help and encouragement from the state.

In Poland, a constitutional principle provides for separation between churches and religious associations and the state (article 82, paragraph 2). This means that state organs and offices, armed forces, state enterprises, state plants and institutions, should be free of religious ceremonies and religious emblems--the reason being that the state is the common good of believers of all religions as well as of nonbelievers. For this reason also, article 2 of the law of 5 July 1961, concerning the development of the system of education, states that schools and other centers of learning and education are secular institutions. The entire program of learning and education in these institutions is of a secular nature. The secularity of the state is a great progressive achievement which was first implemented in some capitalist countries and then in all socialist countries.

Citizens who are believers or adherents of a certain religion may--as I have mentioned already--express their religious convictions outwardly in churches of their religion, in cemeteries, as well as in their homes. There has never been any lack of churches in Poland. New churches are built according to need wherever it is possible. We should note that 912 war-damaged Catholic churches were rebuilt in the years 1944-1970, and that 445 completely new Catholic churches and chapels were built during the same period. 741 permits to build, rebuild, and expand churches and chapels were issued in the year 1971-1980. In 1981 alone, 331 such permits were issued, as well as 5 permits to construct theological seminaries.

On the basis of decree No. 47 of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of 24 November 81, province governors as well as mayors of province capital cities expressed their consent for the period of 1982-1985 for the construction of 304 church buildings, each with an area of over 600 square metres. Additional 42 applications [for permits] to construct such church buildings are

under consideration. At the same time, in 1982, city mayors as well as gmina and city section heads issued close to 300 permits for construction of [Catholic] church buildings, each with an area of less than 600 square metres.

Other religious associations also take advantage of permits to construct new church buildings, but to a much smaller extent. Thus, in Poland there is no lack of churches of all religions.

In 1980-1981, there were some successful attempts to introduce in some industrial plants, and also in schools, religious practices or emblems, contrary to the principle of separation of church and the state. These infringements are being eliminated gradually, at times also on the initiative of clergymen who have a proper understanding of freedom of religion. The secularity of the state means that the state does not serve any particular religion. Likewise, it does not mean that the state wages a struggle against religion. The secularity of the state is a value which should be respected by all citizens and all churches and religious associations, in their own and common interest.

It is a constitutional principle that the state treats all churches and religious associations equally, and that all have identical rights and obligations. This principle has not been assailed in Poland by any church or any religious associations; however, attempts have been made at times to disregard it in some specific cases. The state, treating all churches and religious associations equally, is a guarantor of observance of this principle.

As I have mentioned, the second objective of the Polish People's Republic's policy on religion is elimination of all instances of antisocialist and antigovernment political involvement of clergymen or lay persons who take advantage of religious beliefs for such purposes.

All churches and religious associations have found and can find, to the fullest, a permanent place in the socialist system in Poland and can properly satisfy the religious needs of the citizens as these emerge. Proof of this is, above all, favorable development of relations between the socialist state and all the non-Roman Catholic churches and religious associations which are active in Poland. For a long time now, clergymen of these religions, as well as the majority of their believers, have not engaged in any activities which might harm the socialist system and its basic values, and the Polish socialist state as well as its international alliances. A clear majority of Roman Catholic clergymen are acting in a similar manner at present. Unfortunately, there are still instances of some clergymen, even bishops, utilizing their church positions as well as church buildings and various religious ceremonies to combat and slander the socialist system and its basic social values, the socialist state and its representatives, as well as to undermine and discredit Poland's international alliances, or else providing an opportunity for such actions and permitting them. At present, such facts are meeting with the disapproval of leading personalities and leading groups of the Roman Catholic Church. They are also being condemned, with increasing frequency and audacity, by believers, who expect religious experience in churches and who expect of clergymen prayer and solace and not incitement to commit actions that are directed against the legal order.

One can hope that the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church will be able to effectively and fully shut the Church off from all kinds of attempts which are initiated by determined enemies of People's Poland to utilize this Church or its religion for their purely political destructive activity. This is in the interest of the Polish nation, of the state, and also of the Roman Catholic Church.

Foreign enemies of socialist Poland, and also some domestic ones, have long endeavored to disturb the relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, so as to create an atmosphere of constant tension. They are day-dreaming of a war between the state and the Church. They would like--contrary to the most vital interests of the nation, state, and the Church--to divide our society into believers and nonbelievers, do irreparable damage to the common interests of all our citizens as well as to Poland's welfare, for the sake of their sordid ambitions and desires, which they try to conceal in one way or another.

The third basic objective of the Polish People's Republic's policy on religion is full normalization of the relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, in the same way in which the state's relations with other churches and religious associations have been normalized.

The experience of nearly 40 years of People's Poland has shown that the religious needs of the citizens are very deeply rooted. There are numerous indications that these needs will also continue to exist on a mass scale in a society of achieved socialism. Thus, even in a system of achieved socialism there will be need for churches and religious associations including the Roman Catholic Church. Likewise, the historical experience of People's Poland, and of other countries which have entered the road to socialism, demonstrates that there is no power which would be capable of abolishing socialist authority and turning back the wheel of history. It is a well-known fact that various reactionary, counterrevolutionary and regressive forces have enjoyed the support of influential circles of the Catholic Church and, despite that, have been defeated. This truth is corroborated by Poland's experience in postwar years, including also the years 1980-1982, when these Church circles gave broad support to counterrevolutionary groups and to extremists in labor union and student movement. Today, more than ever before, all of us see clearly that it is sheer delusion to anticipate that Poland might not be socialist. Thus, the real interests of believers and the Church, as well as bitter historical experience, support the view that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland will have a future when it makes a sincere and irreversible effort to find its place in socialism, both during the process of the latter's construction and in the future when socialism has already been achieved.

Our people's state has always strived to have normal relations with the Catholic Church. This position was confirmed by the PZPR Ninth Extraordinary Congress in July 1981. A resolution of the congress states, in part, as follows: "The Congress expresses its respect for and appreciation of the attitude of the Catholic Church, and of other religious associations, which

is characterized by patriotism and by a high sense of responsibility for Poland; the Congress expresses itself in favor of continued constructive development of a dialogue and collaboration between the state and the Church for the good of our fatherland,"¹ The state takes a very serious attitude toward the Catholic Church, trying to meet the latter's needs in the performance of the latter's spiritual mission.

In early February 1983, W. Jaruzelski, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic, gave the following assessment: ". . . the present state of the relations between the state and the Church is, generally speaking, good; even so, I admit that not every aspect of it can be regarded as satisfactory."²

A question arises what is meant by normalcy in the relations between the socialist state and the Catholic Church in Poland? Undoubtedly it means, first of all, that the state does not intend to liquidate the Church, and that the Church does not intend to abolish the socialist system and does not wage a war against the state. It means that there is an accord as to the concepts of the basic interests of the nation and the state as well as of world peace. This accord is the basis for normal relations. Does it mean that there are not controversial issues and no differences between them in their approach to many contemporary problems? Undoubtedly, it is not so, inasmuch as the state's functions are different from the Church's mission. In everyday practice, this normalcy assumes that in these relations there will exist elements of conflict between contradictions which result from the missionary nature of the Church and the secular nature of the state. Such elements do exist in their respective philosophical and ideological areas. They can also appear in regard to some issues in the political area. But one can also visualize that there will be no permanent elements of conflict in this area. And such a situation is desirable and attainable.

An element of the normal relations between the state and the Church is also, if I may say so, the appearance of elements of peaceful coexistence. The state, in principle, takes no interest in the internal life of the Church, in dogmas and religious ceremonies. There are vast areas of the state's activity which are remote from the religious or even charitable mission of the Church and which should and can remain outside the area of the latter's primary interests.

There has always been an area of cooperation between the state and the Roman Catholic Church in resolving many problems that are important to our nation. In a normal situation elements of cooperation will predominate in the relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, just as they predominate in the relations between the state and other churches and religious associations.

A resolution of the PZPR Eighth Congress of February 1980, which has preserved its timeliness in this area, states, in part: "We will favor collaboration by the Church with the socialist state in strengthening the family, in combating negative social phenomena, in propagation of the understanding of the priority of common good, and in uniting our society in the name of Poland's security and prosperity."³ To an ever greater extent, life is giving this directive

specific and diverse meanings. Today it is possible and desirable for collaboration between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, as well as collaboration between the state and other Churches and religious associations, to take place in areas of concern for Poland's independence, integrity of its territory, and its security; in areas of struggle for peace and for termination of the arms race; in areas of fostering of attitudes of modern patriotism, the latter being adapted to present conditions and needs; in areas of fostering and consolidation of moral attitudes; in areas of concern for improvement of our nation's hygiene and health, as well as concern about order and esthetics; in areas of endeavor to increase our nation's material wealth, and to enjoy the fruits of our scientific and technological progress. An important field of collaboration between the state and the Church is the fight against social ills, such as alcoholism, drug addition, rowdyism, etc. In a similar manner, such an area of collaboration can be also the strengthening of respect for social, individual, and personal property. Likewise, strengthening of the family institution, [and] increased concern of parents and guardians for proper education of children, can be areas of fruitful collaboration between the state and the Church. The same can be said about strengthening and fostering of respect for honest and productive work in all areas of people's activity. The state and the Church can do much to strengthen respect for public authority, for observance of laws, and for representatives and functionaries of the state.

An area of collaboration is also represented by protective and charitable work with regard to very needy persons. The state and the Church together can accomplish a great deal in an area of activities which aim at maintaining patriotic ties between Poland and Poles who live abroad permanently, activities which [also] aim at eliminating prejudices and unfavorable or even at times hostile attitudes toward People's Poland that exist in some Polish immigrant communities.

Our experience during recent years also tells us that collaboration between the state and the Church can be quite fruitful when it aims at defusing social emotions and tensions, at eliminating and alleviating social conflicts and their negative effects, and eliminating vast areas of social indifference. Such a collaboration can be of great help in pulling Poland out of the economic, social, and moral crisis which it is still experiencing.

It is likely that areas of collaboration between the state and religious associations will expand as favorable experience may warrant. For collaboration to take place, there is a need for good will; in turn, this good will is a result of a proper understanding of the nation's interests. The state's policy is open to such collaboration.

In normal relations between the state and churches and religious associations, collaboration should, and I believe that it will, predominate despite basic differences in areas of philosophy and ideology and, at times, in the area of politics. It is necessary to have a proper perspective of these relations and of their development.

The relations between Poland and the Vatican are of great importance to the status of the relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church in

Poland. The dialogue between Poland and the Vatican has been continuing for many years. The second visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland, expected to take place on 16-22 June 1983, may contribute to the further development of a constructive dialogue between the state and the Church in Poland as well as to the development of the relations between the Polish People's Republic and the Apostolic See. It may bring closer a full normalization of these relations.

The Polish People's Republic is carrying out a policy which facilitates contacts, within the limits of the existing laws, between churches and religious associations which are active in Poland and their international headquarters as well as their sister churches or religious associations in other countries. It can be said that the Polish People's Republic favors such contacts. This policy has outpaced, by many years, the resolutions of the "Declaration" of the UN General Assembly, adopted on 25 November 1981 and concerning elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination which is based on religion or convictions. Article 6, letter (i) of this "Declaration," with certain limitations, envisions freedom to establish and maintain contacts with individuals and communities as regards religion or convictions, at a national as well as an international level. These contacts consist in, among other things, trips abroad on religious business by representatives of churches and religious associations which are active in Poland, and also in receiving visits from abroad by representatives of churches and religious associations. It is common knowledge that visits of this kind to Poland, as well as visits abroad by representatives of churches and religious associations which are active in Poland, involve hundreds and even thousands of persons every year. Equally close are the contacts of churches and religious associations which are active in Poland with the World Council of Churches in Geneva, as well as with many other international religious associations.

The pope's pilgrimages to Poland also fall within the same category. First such pilgrimage took place in June 1979. At present, the state authorities and the Polish Episcopate invited the holy father, John Paul II, to make another spiritual pilgrimage to his fatherland on the occasion of the jubilee of the 600th anniversary of the icon of God's Mother of Jasna Gora. The pope accepted the invitation.

There are reasons to expect that this visit will result in permanent benefits not only for the Church but for the entire Polish society and state. It will make a contribution to a cause that is at present the most important for the state and for the nation, namely, to reconciliation among Poles, to national understanding, and to normalization [or relations].

FOOTNOTES

1. PZPR Ninth Extraordinary Congress, 14-20 June 1981: Basic Documents and Materials, Warsaw, 1981, KiW [Książka i Wiedza] Pub. Co., p. 116.

2. Gen. Jaruzelski's interview for [Hungarian] daily "NEPSZABADSAG," TRYBUNA LUDU, 5-6 Feb 1983.
3. PZPR Eighth Congress, 11-15 Feb 1980: Basic Documents and Materials, Warsaw, KiW [Ksiazka i Wiedza] Pub.Co., pp. 200-201.

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KOSZALIN PROVINCE PARTY ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Ideological-Vocational Improvement of Teachers

Koszalin GLOS POMORZA in Polish 11 May 83 p 3

[Article by W.N.: "The PZPR Provincial Committee Executive Board at Work: Assessment of Situation in Education; Thanks Expressed to Working People"]

[Text] (Own information). Yesterday, the Executive Board of the party Provincial Committee met under the direction of Provincial Committee Secretary Ryszard Wisniewski. The subject of the session was assessment of the material and technical resources and improvement of cadres in the ministry of education in the Koszalin Province. In materials submitted and in extensive discussion, there was dissatisfaction expressed over the material resources of education in Koszalin Province and the glaring neglect of it. At the session, much attention was devoted to assessing the ideological and vocational improvement of teachers.

More than 6000 teachers work in Koszalin Province. They are a very diversified group often teaching under very difficult conditions. An important role in the improvement of teacher cadres is played by the Koszalin Department of Teacher Improvement which has been operating in its present organizational form since the fall of 1981. In accordance with demands made by the teachers themselves, the functions of teacher improvement, aid and advisory activities were separated from control and assessment functions of pedagogical supervision. The Department of Teacher Improvement was created for this purpose.

The Koszalin Department of Teacher Improvement, as pointed out at the Provincial Committee Executive Board session, is operating under very difficult conditions. Eighteen academic teachers and 32 methodology teachers cannot always fully realize the work of their program due to local conditions and lack of transportation which creates difficulties in getting to more remote schools. The department is also limited by very modest resources for conducting its course activity and publication. In spite of the difficulties, the department is carrying out its mission.

At the session of the Executive Board, certain aspects of the Department of Teacher Improvement's activity, mainly in the area of ideological training, were criticized. This criticism was also addressed to the party school organizations and their more complete inclusion in the process of further improvement of ideological training was proposed along with more activity with your organizations active in the schools such as the ZHP [Polish Scout Union], ZSMP [Union of Socialist Youth of Poland] and ZMW [Rural Youth Union].

The most important mission facing educational workers was emphasized at the Provincial Committee Executive Board meeting and is implanting a program of education and help for teachers working in social and political sciences. In this area, the school party organizations have important tasks to fulfill. This cannot be off-and-on work. Interest in educational matters and the improvement of ideological educational work should be constantly at the center of attention of both the school basic party organizations and the territorial party departments. This is a task which has its place in the foreground.

In its evaluation of ideological and educational work the Provincial Committee Executive Board expressed thanks to all Koszalin provincial teachers who have spared no efforts in working with youth to shape civil and patriotic attitudes among them.

The Executive Board also assessed the state of material resources within the school system. The situation is very unsatisfactory. In many places, the schools are operating under very difficult local conditions, the schools are suffering from a complete shortage of teaching help and the parents, particularly those of young children, are very dissatisfied about the long distances that have to be travelled to consolidated schools, etc. The situation in preschools is no better. This year, for example, 1,230 preschool classroom places were planned whereas 960 were procured. There is also a shortage of teachers (the cadre requirement for the new school year is 486 teachers), teacher housing, etc. The Provincial Committee Executive Board has set up a special team which is preparing concrete recommendations for improving the educational situation in Koszalin Province.

The Provincial Committee Executive Board then heard an assessment of May Day observances in Koszalin Province and the resulting tasks for party organizations and departments. The Executive Board expressed its thanks to working people of the Koszalin region who by their civil and patriotic attitude have demonstrated their support on Labor Day for the socialist program of renewal, emergence from the crisis, stabilization of life in Poland, peace and order - the program of our party's Ninth Congress.

Meeting on Implementation of Resolutions

Koszalin GLOS POMORZA in Polish 18 May 83 p 3

[Article by W.N.: "Joint Session of Provincial PZPR Committee Executive Board and ZSL and SD Provincial Committees in Koszalin: Assessment of Realization of Resolutions on Development of Small-Scale Industry: Direction of Action After Eleventh Plenum of PZPR Central Committee and ZSL Supreme Committee"]

[Text] Yesterday at the party Provincial Committee in Koszalin, a joint session was held by the Provincial PZPR Committee Executive Board, the Presidium of the ZSL Provincial Committee led by Chairman Jan Kapica, and the SD Provincial Committee Presidium with Chairman Zdzislaw Barczak. The session was led by first secretary of the Provincial PZPR Committee, Eugeniusz Jakubaszek.

During the first part of the session, the participants discussed implementation of the resolution made on 29 September 1981 by the Provincial Committee Executive Board and the presidiums of the ZSL and SD Provincial Committees on the matter of reactivation and development of small-scale industry and trades in Koszalin Province. In December of 1981, the Provincial People's Council also held a meeting on this subject. The present joint session was preceded by consultative meetings in Szczecinek, Zlocieniec, Swidwin and Bialogard in which the social and economic activists and functionaries of the PZPR, ZSL and SD, as well as craft representatives took part.

The basis of discussion at yesterday's meeting was analytical material prepared by the Provincial Administration, recommendations made at the consultative meetings and a project for a joint post for evaluation of development of small-scale industry in Koszalin Province which was put before the session. Ten persons spoke during the discussion. All of them tried answer the basic question of whether possibilities for development of small-scale industry and trades in Koszalin Province, especially in the area of market production and services, including those for the rural population, have been put to use and to what extent.

The economic activity of small-scale industry in the past year was concentrated on manufacturing and production of various types of consumer goods for the domestic market and on services, mainly in the area of everyday needs. In 1982, an 8.2 percent increase over the plan was achieved in production and a 16.5 percent increase in services. Last year, the number of craft shops in Koszalin Province went up by 199 which raised the figure at the end of 1982 to 2,999 establishments. Altogether, transactions in the crafts, despite difficulties in obtaining proper supplies of materials, came to 500 million zlotys. This is, however, mainly the result of the rise in prices for products and services.

At the session of the Executive Board and the ZSL and SD Provincial Committees, it was stated that, in spite of the problems occurring in development of small-scale industry, another step was made last year in the direction of reducing market tensions. Small-scale industry and crafts played a large part in this accomplishment. Of course, problems are piling up here as in the whole national economy. This was also discussed at the session. Shortages and deficiencies in the supply of materials and resources, tools and equipment for new service establishments, in funding for development of small-scale industry, and finally, lack of a proper system of funding and taxation were pointed out. The need was stressed for putting inoperative facilities back into operation, taking up organization of local, secondary and waste resources and finally assuming production of goods needed in the Koszalin provincial market.

The Provincial Committee Executive Board and the ZSL and SD Provincial Committee Presidiums arrived at a common position on these matters which calls for assessing the situation and concise direction for action to be taken by PZPR, ZSL and SD organizations and departments and the state administration in the near future. The final portion of this document states that "the Provincial Committee Executive Board and the presidiums of the ZSL and SD Provincial Committees order the party departments and all of their members to create and develop conditions for small-scale industry, to assist the supply of materials and technology and to find and eliminate impediments to development of these industries".

The next point of discussion was the directions for action to be taken by Koszalin Province PZPR and ZSL departments and organizations that come from the resolutions of the Ninth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee and ZSL Supreme Committee. It was stated during this discussion that agriculture in Koszalin Province last year, despite poor atmospheric conditions and frequent shortages of production resources, made many accomplishments of value to the nation. The increase of surface area for sowing grain, the larger grain harvest, and good realization of grain, cattle and milk purchasing are especially deserving of mention. Progress in putting the PFZ [State Land Fund] into lasting operation was very obvious.

On the other hand, criticism was leveled at the prevailing tendency to reduce the area of potato, sugar beet, vegetable and rapeseed cultivation. Not much progress was seen in the cultivation of fodder and especially perennial crops, and there was a drop in soil fertilization and liming. As a especially alarming phenomena, the decline in the condition of cattle and not meeting deadlines with investment work were pointed out.

Recommendations for elimination of these negative phenomena were adopted at the joint session. Meetings of the rural basic party organization and ZSL circles and plenary sessions of the PZPR and ZSL Main Committees are being held on this subject. It has been announced that these problems will be the subject this year of the joint plenum of the PZPR and ZSL Provincial Committees in Koszalin.

Plenum on Improvement of Intraparty Work

Koszalin GLOS POMORZA in Polish 23 May 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by W. Nowak: "Plenary Session of Provincial PZPR Committee in Koszalin: Improvement of Intraparty Work: Jan Kuc Is Provincial Committee Secretary"]

[Text] (Own service) The Provincial PZPR Committee met last Saturday in a plenary session in Koszalin. The subject of the session, led by the Provincial Committee first secretary, Eugeniusz Jakubaszek, was problems in improvement of intraparty work by provincial echelons, its Executive Board and problem commissions. Also taking part in the sessions were the secretaries of territorial PZPR echelons and the directors of party regional work centers.

The Provincial Committee Executive Board's report on the problems of intraparty work by the provincial echelon and its Executive Board was read by Provincial Committee Secretary Zbigniew Krenz. In his introduction, the Provincial Committee secretary said that a year ago, we were talking about the tasks and role of the basic organization and echelons of the party in realizing the party's resolutions. Today, one year later, we can see that such an assessment was necessary and the directions of that time for work in the provincial party organization and concrete activity has produced visible effects: the ideological and organizational cohesion of the party in our region was reinforced.

Z. Krenz stressed that "it has been several months since the Provincial Reports-Programs Conference. In two resolution-programs adopted at the conference, we set tasks to be done for the near future. At the plenum today, we wish to assess our work in this regard. Thus, how have we distributed the burden and responsibility of our work? How are we fulfilling the mandate of our mother party organizations? What sort of party is that of our province and what sort of basic party organizations in particular do we have? How are party members and members of the Provincial PZPR Committee working in their party organizations and levels, in the labor unions, in PRON etc.? These are questions that we should answer."

Continuing the report, the Provincial Committee secretary discussed the activity of the Provincial Committee, its Executive Board and the problem commissions. In the period of the past year and four months of 1983, there were 8 plenary sessions of the Provincial Committee at which were discussed political, ideological, and problems of the young generation and economic problems, all of them important to the region and the provincial party organization. The resolutions and recommendations that were adopted in the course of these sessions contributed to realization of problems that are important to the citizens of this region. At the suggestion of the Provincial Committee, there was also adopted important social initiatives among which must be counted the construction of preschools and schools and a monument to commemorate the contribution of military settlers to the development of the Koszalin region.

Comrade Zbigniew Krenz then analyzed the work of Provincial Committee members and deputy members, their participation in plenary sessions, the work of the Provincial Committee's problem commissions, etc. He pointed out the lack of availability recently among certain committee members, their poor attendance at plenary sessions and lack of participation in discussions, drafting party documents, etc. The Provincial Committee secretary stated that "We are not always aware that, as part of the provincial authorities, we have the statutory duty to actively participate in our own basic party organization and the territorial party echelon. We too seldom convey to our basic party organization and the territorial party echelon information about the work of the Provincial Committee, its notices, remarks and opinions on realization of the party's resolutions, and about the situation and public moods at work and at home."

The necessity of improving the style, methods and form of party work issues from the actual situation in the party, nation and province as these are the phenomena

occurring in our daily work which must disturb and commit the provincial party organization numbering over 33,000 members and candidates, including 13,000 workers, to actions for the purpose of eliminating its weaknesses and shortcomings.

The Provincial Committee secretary, with the help of conducted studies and analyses, again evaluated, in its various aspects, the work of territorial party echelons, regional centers of party work and the work of the aktiv. Stressing the positive elements in this work, he also pointed out its weaknesses such as lack of system, poor follow-up on adopted resolutions and recommendations, lack of intraparty discipline, including among echelon members, nonallocation of tasks (about 30 percent of party members do not have individually allotted tasks), etc. "We know our weaknesses," said Z. Krenz in conclusion, "we know our goals and the tasks standing before us which must be done. At today's plenum, we must tell ourselves what to do to fully realize our none-too-easy plans."

Discussion was begun next. The following comrades spoke.

Krystyna Baraniecka, first secretary of the PZPR City and Community Committee in Zlocieniec, using the sample of her own committee and the party organizations in the town and community, said how the resolutions of the Provincial Reports-Programs Conference and her own are being realized in practice. The basic party organization is aware of the contents of these resolutions and the large KMiG [City and Community Committee] quarterly evaluates their implementation in the city and community. Twice a year, this subject is discussed at the party echelon plenum.

Comrade K. Baraniecka devoted much attention to the work of party organizations, especially with regard to the disposition of party forces. The PZPR city and community organization has more than 49 percent of workers and that determines the proletarian character of the party and the sort of tasks being done by the echelon and the basic party organization. She stressed that the basic matter is one of active work by party members, both during and between basic party organization meetings. This sort of activity is fostered by the assignment of individual tasks to party members and also by assessment of their performance at the party organization meetings.

Sylwester Budnicki, director of the Regional Center for Party Work in Szczecinek, characterized the forms and methods of party work in party echelons and organizations, especially regarding implementation of resolutions and recommendations.

He said "We are already able to plan well and set up timetables for our work, however, there is a lack of consistency in following through in what we plan, although, in the last few months, there has been some improvement in that area." Continuing, Comrade Budnicki spoke about matters involving the disposition and development of the party, work with party members and ideological training conducted by the echelons and the basic party organization. Eighty-seven lecturers take part in the party's activities at ROPP and their participation in political work and ideological training is conspicuous.

Jan Wasielewski, the secretary of the Swidwin basic party organization, spoke about his work as a member of the Provincial Committee in his own basic party organization, in other social organizations and in his environment. He noted the underestimation in the territory of the role of the party echelon member and his neglect in various political undertakings, etc. The party must assign tasks to its members as well as to members of the Provincial Committee. Party workers and officials as well should express themselves in the party press, particularly in GLOS POMORZA. The press will be a forum for exchanging ideas and experiences in party work.

Jerzy Fiedorowicz, deputy director of the Regional Center for Party Work in Koszalin devoted his presentation mainly to discussion of the role of party echelon members in overall party work. The maternal basic party organization should systematically assess those of its members who are members of party echelons and set higher standards before them. Again, echelon members should actively work in their own organization above all and also in other social organizations where they live. He stated that the report shows that there has been a lack of discipline among Provincial Committee members, some of whom rarely appear at the committee's plenary sessions, do not participate in problem commissions, etc. The party must address itself to such comrades and learn the reasons for such behavior. In conclusion, he shared his experiences in work at ROPP.

Stefan Dabrowski, commander of the WOP [Frontier Guard] Baltic Brigade spoke about the attitudes of party members and party echelon members. He said that in many cases we have to deal with a lack of discipline and principle in matters of fundamental interest to the party. The party must resist open and covert attacks by our ideological opponent and class enemy. Party members and, above all, the elected party authorities, should take decisive action to counter hostile views and must be prepared for such action. An important role may be played in this by conversation and discussion and especially full observance of the principles of the PZPR charter and leninist standards of intraparty life.

Jaroslav Jakubiec, first secretary of the PZPR Community Committee in Grzmiaca, spoke about the role of the basic party organization in ideological training and the help in this provided by the party aktiv. There are in the Grzmiaca community 45 graduates of the WUML [Evening University of Marxism-Leninism] prominently aiding the echelon and especially the basic party organization in this difficult and important work. The basic party organization devotes much attention in the community to talks and discussions with nonparty members. As a result of this, 7 new candidates were taken into the party this year, young people enjoying the confidence of their community.

Edward Wyrebiak of Drawsko discussed the role of the party echelon member and his own work in problem commissions of the Provincial Committee and the KMiG of which he is the chairman. He proposed that the Provincial Committee problem commissions make available their analyses and assessments to similar commissions in the territorial party echelons.

The PZPR Provincial Committee Plenum also discussed organizational matters. At the recommendation of the Executive Board, the plenum also elected Jan Kuc into

the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Committee Executive Board and entrusted to him the post of secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee on Social and Economic Affairs. Jan Kuc has for 27 years been a well-known party and economic worker and recently held the office of mayor of Koszalin. The Provincial Committee Plenum also elected into its Executive Board committee member Andrzej Lewandowski, director of the Provincial Committee Political-Organizational Division. There were also changes made in the rosters of the Provincial Committee's problem commissions.

At the conclusion of discussion, First Secretary of the Provincial Committee Eugeniusz Jakubaszek spoke. He mentioned the strengthening of the party and its primary cells in the province. He said that there are, however, still many weaknesses in our party and all of us, the whole provincial party organization, must work together to overcome them. Talks are necessary with many of our members and this includes those members who are not involving themselves in the activity of the new trade unions. Party discipline applies to all members and we must learn to work with the party resolution in our hearts. We are a party of struggle and agreement and we must fight to defend the party's program, policy and ideology. We don't do that enough nor do the members of our party echelons. At the end of his appearance, the Provincial Committee first secretary expressed the best wishes of the Executive Board and the Provincial Committee Plenum to agricultural workers on National Day and stressed the need for constant strengthening of the worker-peasant alliance by all party members in the region.

At the end of its session, the Provincial Committee Plenum adopted a resolution in which it stressed the need to improve the style and methods of party activity in the PZPR provincial organization.

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PROVINCIAL TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED

Unionist Experts on Polish Radio

Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 23 May 83 pp 1, 2

[Text] Last Saturday, a cycle of radio programs entitled "From 8 a.m. Till 8 p.m." was broadcast in the national and local programs. The theme was "Trade Unions--A Close Look." Poznan Radio hosted representatives of the Trade Union Information and Consultation Unit, with its president, Professor Tadeusz Nowak, Vice President Piotr Gaszynski, and trade union activists in enterprises: Andrzej Tereba from H. Cegielski Works and Roman Piec from the Roller Bearing Factory, both in Poznan.

An editorial office telephone started ringing early in the morning. First questions and answers as well as a report on the state of the trade union movement in the Poznan Province were transmitted in the "Radioexpress" at 6:30. Information on trade unions in the Poznan Province, furnished by Prof T. Nowak, was broadcast in the national program. The current figures on the trade union movement in the Poznan Province are as follows: There are 351 registered trade union organizations, 90 applications are under consideration, and in 300 enterprises organizing initiatives are under way and either initiatory groups or founding committees are active.

In addition, radio listeners were informed about forms of activities open to the consultative unit. The unit continues in its consultative function with respect to interpreting the laws regulating union matters; moreover, it continues training trade union activists by organizing systematic cycles of sessions devoted to different trades, one after another. Its activities also include assisting state farms as well as metal workers and--in the near future--construction workers in organizing supra-enterprise structures. The unit has markedly increased its composition by including union activists and thus attained an actual survey of the trade union movement.

The listeners' response to the radio initiative was considerable. People called to ask about the responsibilities of trade union (like, for instance, they inquired whether they cover the distribution of places in vacation homes and summer camps), management of property taken over from former trade unions; or concerned about problems faced by workers in enterprises where no unions were yet functioning, they asked for an interference.

The callers inquired about regulations pertaining to the formation of trade union organizations in enterprises; how many persons are required for a group to qualify as a corporate body, etc. They offered their suggestions and opinions as to the proper scope of unionist concerns and activities. They also discussed the structure of wages and salaries and how it should change with a number of years worked.

A number of people who called were concerned about the possibility of expanding the trade union movement and involving young people. A. Treba, a representative of the young generation of trade unionists from the H. Cegielski Works responded to those questions. He said that the two were closely inter-related. The future, expected image of the trade unions is dependent on the involvement of young people, their active participation, fresh outlooks and willingness to participate in the life of their communities.

Trade Unions in Enterprises

Koszalin GLOS POMORZA in Polish 23 May 83 p 5

[Text] The trade union movement, organized on the basis of the Sejm regulation of October 1982, has slowly grown and consolidated. There are many examples available at the moment to prove that concrete action by trade unions in response to workers' needs is approved by both union members and nonmembers.

In Koszalin, the workers of the Municipal Sanitation Department are 75 percent union members (the union also includes a dozen retired workers). There was no need here to cajole workers, plead or induce them to sign up their union membership forms. The people decided by themselves that they needed a union. Adversaries may not have been entirely lacking, but the founding group did not face any attempts to boycott their action.

A proposition to form a trade union emerged from within one of the five enterprises forming the Koszalin Municipal Sanitary Department. The initiatory group applied for and obtained the directors' permission to call a general meeting. Most of those who attended were in favor of the initiative. Therefore, a 10-person founding committee was elected and it soon concluded its work and the union was registered.

The name of the union did not contain such phrases as "independent" or "self-governing" because--as I was told by their chairman--the name is meaningless unless activists are prepared to make use of guaranty available to them under the Sejm regulation. The founding committee decided that the name of the organization was any way too long to blow it up with additional words and the omission made it sound less pretentious.

Election was postponed from mid-January till March and was announced only after the majority of workers decided to join the union. They felt it was the best way to do, so that nobody could charge board members that they were self-elected or elected by a minority.

Every second week (and more often when necessary) the seven-person board holds its meetings, with each enterprise represented. There are two permanent committees: social committee and tourist-recreational committee; as at the moment this is the scope of the union's long-term activities.

Other matters are handled by the board. The chairman was very specific that the board members worked collectively on a day to day basis and he proposed that either all names were listed in this piece or none mentioned at all.

The general meeting of the organization demanded its board to run it in a down-to-earth manner. That includes the programs of activities. The board is responsible on a quarterly basis before the meeting and had to account for the tasks which were programmed.

The quarterly program was formulated and it covered the inspection of all workplaces from the point of view of work safety requirements. The program included long-term goals like, for instance, providing union protection to all workers in the enterprises irrespective of their union membership and taking care of all retired and disabled workers. These goals, which are already partly implemented, followed upon the resolution by the general meeting. Being open to the problems of all workers earned sympathy for the organization and new membership applications followed.

There are very few strictly union matters to be discussed in the closed meetings of the organization. This is the board's working attitude and the trade union is closely cooperating with other organizations active in the enterprises.

The union board invites the first secretary of the party organization, the chairman of the workers' council and the manager to attend their meetings. Due to this policy, certain doubts can be dispelled at once, and decisions can be reached together. On the other hand, board members attend meetings of other organizations and therefore they are currently informed on the problems other organizations are concerned with. Occasionally it may happen that the same problem is deliberated on different forums and then it is often convenient to reach a consensus of opinion.

It was like that in the case of wages and salaries. Despite the fact that profit was made last year, the managers of the Municipal Sanitation Department were not able to live up to their promise and raise wages and the people kept asking for their raise. After extensive discussions, the bodies of representatives decided that wages could be raised only by reducing employment and increasing work efficiency. It was understood that the reduction of employment could not be achieved by dismissing workers with a notice. However, there was a marked fluctuation of employment within certain groups, partly accountable by work specificity. It was proposed to the directors that vacated workplaces should be filled in by shifting workers from other places and savings achieved by reduced employment would form a fund for raising wages.

It was calculated that for the Koszalin Municipal Sanitary Department employing about 100 workers would mean approximately a 300,000-zloty saving for the May-December period. Some 30-40 percent of that amount should go to workers who were willing to accept an increased workload. The rest could go for raises for the worst-paid workers. The approach was tested experimentally. A three-person team consisting of a driver and two collectors was replaced with a two-person team or a driver and a collector, the two splitting between them the work done by the third person. They both were better paid and the quality of their job was as good as before. Encouraged by the experiment, other teams offered to try to work by twos.

The managers found the workers' proposal to be right and decided to advance gradually this form of employment reduction. The managers and the trade unionists also considered other common objectives like, for instance, "slimming" administrative personnel or economizing on fuel. There were many detailed routine matters where a common decision was reached, irrespective whether they were initiated by one organization or another.

The chairman of the union board wondered whether people did not expect too much out of their union. How would union members respond in the situation where the board failed to achieve an essential progress in matters of vital concern to workers? Not because they did not try hard enough or were negligent or malicious, but because little could be done under concrete circumstances. In a sense, the board tried to protect itself against this possibility, as evidenced by the public vote on board members' position on the role and place of the union in the enterprise, and forms and methods of activities. They considered that it was not permissible for the board to fish for easy popularity by promising results which could not be achieved and raising appetites which could not be satisfied. If the board miscalculated in their plans and endeavors, they should be able to acknowledge their mistakes without tragic posturing. This would never happen if the trade unionists were to act within the reality framework and in close cooperation with the workers' council and the party organization.

Board members were of the opinion that the union should represent the workers' interests but not at any cost. They should not, for example, defend a drunk and lazybody just because he happened to be a union member. They should be concerned with justice for all, but justice does not mean to everybody by the same measure. People should be made aware of this, especially because people tend to overestimate their achievement as compared to an impartial estimate from the outside. People should be held responsible for their actions, but the union should remember that the people are vulnerable to unjust treatment and malicious attacks.

The board chairman was worried by another question: the prejudice against the sanitation workers. Their hard and poorly rewarded work without which no urban organism could possibly exist, ranks low in public estimation. Although workers in the enterprise were not overtly dramatic about this lack of social esteem, it is certainly not nice to be daily snubbed. It was considered what should be done by the union to raise the society's image of sanitation workers' contribution.

Union Activities at Tarnobrzeg, Piaseczno

Rzeszow NOWINY in Polish 23 May 83 p 2

[Text] The climate of isolation, distance and even enmity surrounding the new trade unions may by all signs have been overcome. In the Tarnobrzeg Siarkopol, the Sulfur Miners and Processing Workers Trade Union numbers over 2,100 members. The union board occupies three rooms which were previously used for years by the Factory Council of the Chemical Workers' Trade Union.

Last Friday we paid a visit to Stanislaw Dendura, deputy president of the board, who busily rushed about as he split his time between handling current business, answering several phones in different rooms and talking to the journalist.

"President Wladyslaw Stepine," he informed, "is attending the election meeting in the Jezioro mine, Deputy President Boleslaw Gawlik and Secretary Helena Winiarz are attending another similar meeting at the Construction and Repair Enterprise in Piaseczno."

In view of the specificity of their combine and in order to stay close in touch with crew and their problems, Siarkopol trade unionists employ the two-stage structure of administration required by regulations. In all enterprises and departments employing over 100 union members (and there are nine enterprises like that) and also in the R&D Center for the Sulfur Industry, the Pilot Plant, and the Construction and Repair Enterprise, union board members and president are elected by the union meetings.

The first election meeting was already held and it took place in the Pilot Plant and the president's function was entrusted to Mieczslaw Chwalek.

What have been recent concerns of the 25-person union board?

Most of our time was absorbed by problems connected with the implementation of the Council of Ministers' Regulation No 250, concerned with an amendment of the system of wages and salaries aimed towards increasing workers' motivation for good and efficient work. The system is not yet sufficiently elaborated in all details but...it is binding from 1 May. The system accounts for two elements: quality and efficiency of work, and work discipline in appraising work by each crew member. The point system of work appraisal aroused a number of doubts amidst the crew. We are sounding their opinion and presenting their view points to the directors during continued consultative meetings.

For managers of the Tarnobrzeg Siarkopol, the Sulfur Mining and Processing Workers' Trade Union is a partner whom they have to consider. Consultative meetings attended by the entire board considered also the bylaws concerning the crew's participation in the profit made by the enterprise and the housing program. The bylaws and in particular the sectional participation of crews of various enterprises in the profit made gave rise to variegated opinions. For instance, workers employed by WOW or a department concerned with the treatment of industrial sewage ultimately discharged to the river had little profit to share, because fines charged by KIZPS for exceeding the permissible pollutive levels ate up their participation in the profit made. In their opinion, however, they were not to be blamed for this state of affairs. The union board accepted their reasoning that it was the fault of technical parameters of their equipment and not the workers fault. In the final reckoning, the managers had to find resources to be distributed among workers in this department.

The claim of workers of the fertilizers department was similar. The managers intended to put losses resulting from dispersal of superphosphate during loading at their account. In this case also the managers came to accept the workers' point of view that the losses resulted because of deficient technology and they had to be attributed to the poor technical condition of railway carriages, which were often in disrepair. The union board also supported a claim by two

young workers of the Tank Repair Department who questioned the basis of counting their profit participation. Despite the fact that they are skilled workers qualified for their job they were poorly paid. The board also supported the claim by workers of the M-3 Department who attained considerable savings by using secondary raw materials as anticorrosion controls.

It is our concern, said Stanislaw Dendura, to make the binding bylaws more precise and objective as far as they are concerned with work appraisal. Housing construction is another topic of consultation with the management. A committee headed by union member Tadeusz Fornal is in charge of this problem. Each Thursday the committee received applicants, but so far little could be done for them or even promised. Accompanying investments, in particular housing investments, were neglected in KizPS for years. It does not mean that consultations are of little help in solving this urgent question. During these consultations with the management the trade union board presented their opinion that the managers should do all that is possible to intensify individual housing building and proposed to increase the crew of the construction and repair department by 50 persons delegated from other enterprises forming the combine. The specialization of this "storm" brigade would be to prepare construction sites and extend the housing estate's infrastructure by laying out roads and pavements, etc.

Trade union workshops have recently included the topic of workers' vacation places and summer camps. Their organization as well as distribution of places amidst workers is the charge of the Department for Social Management. The board interferes only in cases where the department's decisions are claimed to be wrong. However, in this sphere there are also problems which need to be solved. One of those is a new children's vacation place on the seaboard (to replace the one destroyed by a storm in Leba). The board exerts pressure on the administration to start building because they are aware that unless the work is started this summer, next year's vacation season is wasted.

Another telephone call interrupted our conversation. It was a worker from the electric power plant who declared his intention to join the trade union. Stanislaw Dendura advised him call a trade union senior delegate in his plant, Engineer Tadeusz Kwasek who would take care of formalities.

People's Control Commission on Unions

Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 23 May 83 pp 1, 2

[Text] Working conditions of the trade union movement were the main topic of a meeting of the People's Consultative Commission at the State Council held on 20 May. Chaired by the chairman of the commission, Professor Zbigniew Salwa, the meeting adopted a conception of the system of educating trade union activists in 1983-84. The State Council's regulation increased the commission's membership, including 8 chairmen of trade unions in enterprises from different provinces.

The results of the questionnaires sent by the People's Consultative Commission to over 200 board members of trade unions in enterprises formed the starting point of discussion on the conditions under which the trade unions are operative.

This opinion poll confirmed the impression that the situation in the trade union movement is extremely diversified. For instance, the nation's average trade union membership is 20 percent of the workforce, but this average conceals the differences (ranging from 5 to 90 percent) between enterprises. The degree of workers' organization means different opportunity for trade union action. Trade unions with bigger membership and especially those in big enterprises have of course better opportunities.

Reasons slowing down the numerical growth of trade unions are also greatly varied. Part of the crew members, especially in big urban centers, hold back and are waiting. On the other hand, in many small enterprises the predominant feeling is that of doubt whether the new trade unions can be an efficient defenders of workers' rights. A portion of crew members yields to the pressure of the underground. The point was discussed by Bogusaw Banaszyk, chairman of the board of the Dozamat Lower Silesia Metallurgical Works Trade Union and a recently appointed member of the People's Consultative Commission. He emphasized the need for intensified propagandist effort to win over those workers who are undecided.

Another difficulty in way of the new trade unions is that created by enterprise administration. Trade unionists drew attention to the fact that administrations often lack in honest cooperation, occasionally verging on undisguised enmity on part of certain members of managements. In general, trade unionists demanded to be consulted in an authentic spirit of cooperation on all projects and decisions deemed of importance to working people. They also variously estimated the response they got from ministerial departments. Contacts of trade unions with the departments have recently improved a lot - among other reasons, as a result of the interventions by the People's Consultative Commission - but certain meetings at the departmental levels were informative rather than consultative. Against this background stands out as a positive example the minister of administration who informed all trade unions what his attitude was to all points raised during his meeting with trade union representatives directly after the meeting.

In certain enterprises, managers do not consider trade unions to be principal partners in dealing with matters pertaining to people's living conditions. The distribution of vacation places and places in health resorts is often conducted without the participation of trade unions. It is also not exceptional for managers to overlook their responsibility to inform trade unions about their intention of dismissing a worker. The commission considered it advisable for the minister of labor to pass on to all managers a complete list of trade union privileges as specified in various bills and normative acts and remind them of their duty to respect those privileges. They should also be reminded of the principle that the trade unions represent the entire workcrew, and not only their membership.

The new trade unions are also faced with financial problems, unavoidable in the starting phase. In addition, not all trade unions took over property and finances represented by former trade unions active at enterprises and in certain enterprises all they inherited were debts. Certain organizations do not have

sufficient fund for statutory grants-in-aid, to say nothing about salaries of trade unionists. Therefore, possibilities were considered of low-interest bank credits for trade union organizations at their initial phases. It is also necessary to solve the financial and technical problems facing the newly formed supra-enterprise structures at least until their first conventions are held. An offer of assistance was extended by chairman of the Committee for Management of the property of Trade Unions Piotr Karpiuk who was appointed by the State Council as a permanent participant in the works of the People's Consultative Commission.

The problem of collective contracts is a point in the trade unions' programmatic activity ripe for decision. Associate Professor Wodzimierz Piotrowski found the matter to be a key problem for trade unions qualifying their stature but also a very difficult matter under current legislation and under the condition of economic reform. Present collective contracts appended with a multitude of amendments became quite illegible; besides they are inconsistent with and lag behind the current raises of wages and salaries; discussed were also limitations imposed by the current economic situation. The situation is worsened by the tendency to multiply sections of economy in building supra-enterprisal structures. In place of a single contract signatory we might now have several or even a dozen, up to 20. Stanislaw Hasiak proposed to solve the problem by signing contracts at the level of enterprises specifying wages and salaries with the participation of trade unions active at these enterprises before it is possible to order, negotiate and sign new collective contracts. The proposal was supported by the minister of labor, wages and salaries and social matters, Stanislaw Ciosek. The commission also recommended as necessary to start working on updating the labor Code.

During the meeting, Secretary of the State Council Jerzy Szymanek handed appointment bills to new members of the People's Consultative Commission.

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